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1 Introduction 
In December 2001, the Swedish television programme “Kalla Fakta” uncovered the 
story of Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed El Zari, who after having been denied asylum 
in Sweden, were arrested by the police and deported in haste to Egypt. The two men 
were suspected of terrorist activities and even though Egypt was well-known to 
mistreat political opponents in general, and alleged Islamic terrorists in particular, the 
Swedish government decided to have them transferred. Both Agiza and El Zari later 
claimed that they were tortured in Egypt. The disclosure resulted in a massive outcry 
and the Swedish government were heavily criticised by a great number of both 
domestic and international actors for having violated its international law obligations 
and Agiza’s and El Zari’s human rights. Sweden, on the other hand, claimed that it 
had done whatever one could possibly require to ensure that the men were treated 
correctly, while also making sure that its national security was protected. 
This claim sheds a light on an old conflict that has been reinforced by the emerge of 
the globalised threat from terrorism and the violent and repressive responses towards 
it; namely, how to at once respect state security and human rights. The attacks of 9/11 
and the “Global War on Terrorism” (the GWoT) have created an atmosphere where 
this conflict has increased to a level so that it now seems unsolvable and where the 
proponents of each perspective seem to have less and less understanding for the 
arguments of the opponent. The main argument of many governments, as well as 
many others, is that human rights and democracy can only be ensured and protected 
by states and that this requires that threats against the states security have to be 
eliminated. The human rights advocates, on the contrary, claim that fundamental 
institutions such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights cannot be protected 
by the undermining of the same. 
These differing apprehensions is a necessary context when discussion the possible 
development of this conflict; however, the factual situation at present is that states 
have an obligation, and a right, to respect and promote them both. The right of the 
state to control its frontiers has been articulated by the European Court of Human 
Rights: 
The Court reiterates in the first place that Contracting States have the right, as a 
matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations 
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including the Convention [the European Convention of Human Rights], to control the 
entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.1 
However, this right is not absolute and there are many provisions in international law 
limiting it, whereof one such is the principle of non-refoulement. This obligation, 
expressed in a number of treaties (see below), basically means that a state shall refrain 
from, in any manner whatsoever, rendering a person to a country where he or she 
might face torture or ill- treatment. For this reason, Sweden should not have deported 
Agiza and El Zari to Egypt. 
However, before the two Egyptians were deported, Sweden received a diplomatic 
assurance from Egypt, an aid-memoire wherein an Egyptian official assured that 
Egyptian law would be respected and the men treated humanely. The Swedish 
government argued that this assurance depleted the risk that the men would be 
tortured, and that, consequently, sending them to Egypt could not amount to 
refoulement. If Agiza and El Zari were to be tortured nonetheless, Sweden had 
fulfilled its legal obligations and the responsibility would be solely Egypt’s. 
This is but one example of how diplomatic assurances are used by governments as a 
tool to, in their view, juxtapose state security and human rights. However, the use of 
diplomatic assurances could also be regarded as a circumvention of the principle of 
non-refoulement. If the principle is to protect people from torture, what is this 
protection worth if an assurance not to torture from a state that is well-know to do just 
that, is considered enough? 
Most previous studies have focused on the legal implications with diplomatic 
assurances. This have resulted in interesting analyses about whether they could ever 
be in accordance with international law or not, and, if the can, what the requirements 
would have to look like. However, this is a rather limited methodology; it offers an 
explanation, but no understanding of the concept. To understand where the use of 
diplomatic assurances stem from, and what it might result in, requires that they are 
put in a political context and analysed from a more theoretical perspective.  
                                                 
1 TI v. UK, Application no. 43844/98, March 7, 2000, p. 14. 
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1.1 Objective/purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the use of diplomatic assurances and its 
consequences for the principle of non-refoulement. First from a judicial perspective, 
analysing the legal implications of the method. Subsequently, I contextualize it 
theoretically and politically to understand how a systematic use of the method might 
undermine the principle of non-refoulement, and, furthermore, what political 
procedures that have led up to this. Using Gregor Noll’s terminology (see below), the 
first part is about the politicisation of law and the second about the mystification of 
politics. The aim is to discuss how diplomatic assurances and the undermining of non-
refoulement are not only judicially problematic, but also to discuss what wider 
implications this might have. The political analysis is used both as a background for 
understanding how this development has been possible, and to discuss what 
consequences it might have. Moreover, the objective is to show that diplomatic 
assurances are a part of a more complex system of de-humanising certain people and 
the creation of a permanent state of emergency. Finally, and hopefully, the intent is to 
analyse how this development could be reversed. Or, in legal terms, the paper starts 
out with a description of de lege lata and concludes with de lege ferenda. 
1.2 Delimitations  
Diplomatic assurances are a part of a complex system of methods, used to counter 
terrorism. I analyse the nexus between diplomatic assurances and the “Global War on 
Terrorism” (GWoT), and discuss the political context wherein the method is being 
used. However, there are many other important issues that also relate to this, such as 
indefinite detentions and extraordinary renditions. These too, are methods which have 
implications on the principle of non-refoulement, and for a more comprehensive 
understanding of how the GWoT is in conflict with this principle, both indefinite 
detentions and extraordinary renditions should have to be analysed. But so should, 
perhaps, all human rights implications the GWoT have unleashed. It is not only the 
principle of non-refoulement that is undermined; combating terrorism has lead to 
many limitations and derogations from fundamental human rights all over the world. 
Whether this is a necessary process for strengthening the state’s ability to counter a 
lethal enemy, or, instead, a role-back of the democratic principles the war is said to 
protect, has been subject to many debates. Since there is not room for an all too 
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extensive analysis of terrorism in this paper, I have limited the focal point to 
diplomatic assurances. Nevertheless, the method and its implications are analysed 
from a broad legal and political perspective in the context of a more general 
discussion about terrorism. 
In the judicial section, the main focus is on international law. Domestic legal systems 
are highly relevant since it is they that form the ground for what is considered 
criminal or not, and also regulating the limits and possibilities for how state officials 
can act. But in this aspect too, I have had to delimit the scope of the paper. Since the 
most central norm in my analysis is the principle of non-refoulement, and this 
principle is derived from a number of international legal instruments, I have chosen to 
mainly focus on international law. What is used from national legal framework is 
preferentially case law and national courts’ interpretations.  
As for the theories I use to contextualize the judicial problems, I have turned to ideas 
that add an extra dimension to the understanding of the problems. Analysing a 
specific issue with the help of one or a few specific theories necessarily means that all 
other theories have to be excluded. This does not mean that these are not relevant or 
could contribute to the understanding as well. However, I have chosen the theories 
below with the intent to, with the help of them, connect the judicial debate about 
diplomatic assurances with a more theoretical discussion about terrorism. 
Furthermore, the theories are chosen because their close interrelation and their focus 
on political causes and possible outcomes. The exclusion of other theories 
consequently results in but one possible answer and my conclusions are therefore 
limited to the perspectives of the theories used. Nevertheless, I consider them to offer 
a fruitful understanding of how terrorism, seen as a political conflict, should be 
analysed to be handled properly. 
1.3 Overview 
This paper is divided into two sections. In the first I will analyse diplomatic 
assurances from a judicial perspective. The starting-point is, since this is a paper in 
international law, thus, a legal analysis. To be able to do this, I start out with a brief 
discussion about terrorism and the international legal framework. After that, I 
continue with a more comprehensive outlook on the principle of non-refoulement. 
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The main focus here is on the relevant sources and instruments where this principle is 
to be found. 
After that has been established, I turn to a discussion about how this principle is under 
attack from different actors. From having been considered absolute, it has now started 
to erode. Especially due to the fact that many states consider it necessary to resort to 
extreme measures to combat terrorism. One such is diplomatic assurances. In the 
following part, I elaborate on this method and analyse its legal implications. Could it 
be seen as a useful tool for striking a balance between state security and human rights, 
or, should it, as some argue, be strictly prohibited by international law? 
In the last part of the first section, I analyse whether a systematic use of diplomatic 
assurances might be a way to create a parallel set of norms, and because of this, 
undermine non-refoulement. Could it be that this absolute provision only covers some 
people and that the alleged terrorists are excluded? If the answer is yes, what are the 
legal implications for the system of norms that prohibits refoulement? 
This is where the next section overlaps and begins. This section centres on the 
political background of terrorism and, in particular, states’ reactions to it. The 
assumption is that this section should be the context where the undermining of non-
refoulement could be further analysed and dissected. Section two is at once a 
background, explaining how this development has been possible and what has been 
the force behind it, and an analysis of how the reactions to terrorism risk enhancing 
and increasing the conflict. The evaporation of non-refoulement is an illustrating 
example of how state security takes precedence over human rights. 
In the first part of the second section, I describe Chantal Mouffe's theory of agonism. 
This is the theory with the least connection to diplomatic assurances and non-
refoulement. The reason why Mouffe is important is because she offers an explanation 
to how the Western political systems have failed to acknowledged terrorism 
politically. This is a fundamental understanding, for later being able to grasp how 
diplomatic assurances could be seen as a part of what she describes as a widening gap 
between different collectives and a moralisation of the political. 
In the next part, I focus on Andreas Behnke's application of Carl Scmitt's theory of the 
partisan as a subject that escalates conflicts, on today's global terrorists. Because both 
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Behnke's and Mouffe's theories emanate from Schmitt, and Behnke uses the same 
conceptual framework as Mouffe, his discussion could be described as somewhat of 
an operationalisation of Mouffe's theory of agonism. Through the analysis of the 
terrorist as a partisan, he offers an explanation of how the GWoT is constantly 
present, even when terrorism is discussed in legal and criminal terms. 
The third part of the second section deals with Gregor Noll's application of the same 
idea on the partisan. His conclusions are similar to Behnke's, but he also shows how 
this development takes place in a context where the law is re-politicised and politics 
re-mystified. This is closely related to Mouffe's description of the moralisation of the 
political. The use of diplomatic assurances have to, applying Noll's theory to the first 
section of this paper, be understood as a result of political interests. These interests 
are affected by a mystified idea about terrorism. Moreover, Noll argues that this 
might, as described by Giorgio Agamben, lead to a permanent state of emergency, 
since the GWoT in this context is indefinite. 
The fourth theory I use is the theory of securitisation. The basic assumption is that 
certain issues can be removed from the normal course of politics, to so called “high 
politics”, through the act of securitisation. This, too, could be described as an 
operationalisation of the previous theories, since it tries to practically explain how a 
particular actor can frame a particular subject as securitised, and, by this, show how 
the undermining of non-refoulement is a natural result of the securitisation of 
terrorism. 
Lastly, I follow Noll’s thought on how the undermining of international law is no 
longer an exception, but perhaps the norm, and turn to a discussion about the state of 
emergency. Firstly, I try to show the connection between the theory of securitisation 
and Carl Schmitt's idea about the state of emergency. Subsequently, I conclude with 
Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Schmitt. Agamben, whose starting point also is 
Schmitt, claims that Schmitt was right in his assumption that the state of emergency is 
a necessary tool for protecting the political system, and, as such, what constitutes the 
foundation for this system. However, according to Agamben, the state of emergency 
is becoming the norm instead of the exception. In the moralised conflict Mouffe 
describes, or the re-mystified politics that Noll distinguishes, the GWoT has no end. 
Therefore, it is probable that the state of emergency becomes permanent, legitimising 
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a de-humanisation of everyone not included in the community. 
This is where, in the last part of this paper, the two sections finally, and most 
intensely, overlap. A systematic use of diplomatic assurances, together with all other 
measures undermining human rights, is a major part of the creation of a parallel legal 
and political system, offering different rights to different people. Some people, the 
alleged terrorist, are deprived of all their rights and permanently de-humanised. The 
problem with diplomatic assurances is, thus, not only their legal flaws, but most 
severe is how they increase the antagonism. 
Section I – judicial analysis 
2 Relevant laws for terrorism 
The legal system of norms regarding terrorism is rather complex. There is no 
universally accepted definition of the concept and there are a wide variety of 
approaches to how it best should be dealt with. States are, to a certain extent, limited 
in how to prevent criminality. All states guided by the rule of law have regulations 
that restrict how the police, attorneys and courts are allowed to work. In addition to 
the general restrictions, there are certain crimes that can be particularly hard to 
prevent and investigate with normal procedures. Terrorism is one such, and the desire 
to create a special regime of laws and exclusions from existing norms can be 
irresistible. However, the risk is that this regime will collide with existing norms, 
especially human rights law (HRL). Furthermore, because of the political nature of 
terrorism, a creation of particular rules and exclusions might give the perpetrators the 
impression that they are political offenders rather than criminal. Thus, this kind of 
legislation runs the risk of legitimising what it strives to prevent.2 
2.1 International Conventions  
On the international level, terrorism has traditionally been regulated by prohibiting 
particular acts, such as hijacking of airplanes and taking hostages.3 But what 
distinguish terrorism from other kinds of criminality are not necessarily the methods, 
                                                 
2 Warbrick, Collin, “The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights”, in European 
Journal of International Law, 2004, Vol. 15, No. 5, p. 989. 
3 See Bruin, Rene and Wouters, Kees, ’Terrorism and the non-derogability of non-refoulement’, in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2003, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 14, for a complete list. 
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but rather the intent (the mens rea). The acts are committed for a certain reason, 
which, of course, can differ, but trying to find one mutually agreed upon definition of 
this subjective prerequisite has proven to be very difficult.4 This is the reason why this 
more limited approach, which has criminalised one act at the time, has been the 
chosen option for the time being. The problem with this system is that states have 
ratified different treaties and implemented them in different ways. With no general 
definition, it has been very hard to fight international terrorism judicially, in part 
because of the lack of grounds for extradition and prosecution. But this judicial 
problem of finding a legal definition could also be seen as a symbol of how terrorism 
is perceived: because of the political nature of the issue, the barriers to reach a 
consensus are enormous. 
The biggest threshold has been how to distinguish terrorism from legitimate resistance 
and freedom fighters. If terrorism is defined too broadly, it has been argued that the 
right to oppose oppression would be undermined. Whether acts of violence are 
legitimate or whether they are acts of terrorism ultimately lies in the eye of the 
beholder: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Another 
controversial issue in agreeing upon a definition on terrorism has been whether state 
terrorism should be included or not. Whereas some have argued that this is just as 
important as preventing terrorism from non-state actors, others have claimed that the 
two should not be mixed up and that what would fall under the concept of state 
terrorism is already prohibited in other legal instruments.5 
However, following the attacks of September 11, there seems to have been an 
increased effort to change the perspective and a will to come up with a generic 
definition of terrorist crimes. Cooperation has also increased in criminal law matters 
in general, which, too, helps in facilitating the impeachment of terrorists.6 Thanks to 
treaties such as the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and 
the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, a more useful, but still limited, 
judicial definition now seems to be at hand.7 The common denominators of these 
                                                 
4 For a further description of this process, see Saul, Ben, “Attempts to define Terrorism in international 
law”, in Netherlands International Law Review, 2005, Vol 52 No. 1. 
5 Higgins, Rosalyn, ’The general international law of terrorism’, in Higgins, Rosalyn and Flory, 
Maurice (eds), 1997, Terrorism and international law, London: Routledge, pp. 14f. 
6 One such example is the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, June 13, 2002. 
7 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, article 2; and EU 
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definitions are that they refer to, (1) certain expressed acts that, (2) must be 
committed with a special intent, dolus specialis, for the act to amount to terrorism.8 
Antonio Casese even argues that a universally accepted definition of terrorism exists 
in international law today. 9 This is, however, not a very common understanding. 
Nevertheless, the international community has definitely strengthened its effort to 
combat terrorism as a criminal offence.10 
2.2 UN Security Council Resolutions  
There have been a number of resolutions stemming from the United Nations Security 
Council regarding international terrorism. The majority have focused on 
recommendations and information, so called soft law instruments, but some have also 
included state obligations, i.e. hard law. According to the UN Charter, articles 25 and 
48(1), the Security Council has the right to adopt legally binding decisions. These 
decisions have traditionally been limited to particular events, both geographically and 
in time. Consequently, the Security Council has previously not been a law-making 
institution, in the sense that they introduced new universally binding norms.11 
However, with resolution 137312, the Security Council could be said to have created 
new precedence. Paul Czasz describes the effects of the resolution as follows: 
[A]s resolution 1373, while inspired by the attacks of September 11, 2001, is not 
specifically related to them (though they are mentioned in the preamble) and lacks 
any explicit or implicit time limitation, a significant portion of the resolution can be 
said to establish new binding rules of international law – rather than mere commands 
relating to a particular situation – and, moreover, even creates a mechanism for 
monitoring compliance with them. 13 
Thus, resolution 1373 includes internationally binding norms that regulates how states 
shall combat terrorism. What is highly problematic, though, is the lack of a 
                                                                                                                                           
Framework decision on Combating Terrorism, article 1. 
8 In the Convention for the Suppression on the Financing of Terrorism these are: (1) seriously 
intimidating a population; or (2) unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to 
perform or abstain from performing any act. The EU Framework Decision also adds: or (3) seriously 
destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country or an international organization. 
9 Casese, Antonio, 2005, International Law, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 449, 
referring to UN GA res. 49/60. 
10 Bruin and Wouters, 2003, p. 6. 
11 Szassz, Paul, “The Security Council starts legislating”, in The American Journal of International 
Law, 2002, Vol. 96, No. 4, p. 901. 
12 UN SC res. 1373, September 28, 2001. 
13 Szasz, 2002, p. 902. 
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comprehensive definition of terrorism. Nowhere in the resolution is this to be found 
and neither in any other of the resolutions that concerns terrorism. 14 Obliging states to 
take action against something that is not defined clearly encourages complications. 
Firstly, states may feel compelled to interpret the term very inclusively in order to 
uphold their obligations. Secondly, this could be exploited as a good excuse to strike 
down on political opponents and other groups by allowing for states themselves to 
define terrorism. 
2.3 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute is the founding document of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). In this treaty, the jurisdiction for the court is determined. It contains four 
categories of crimes15, whereof terrorism is not explicitly expressed. Nevertheless, 
many have argued that terrorism often could fall under the category crimes against 
humanity, depending of the severity of the terrorist act.16 To amount to crimes against 
humanity the act has to be directed at a civilian population, be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack and the perpetrator has to be aware that his or her act is a part of this 
complex of attacks. An important notion is that the act could be either widespread or 
systematic. 
The last of the criteria, the subjective, can be hard to prove. It is not enough with a 
criminal intent, knowledge about the act itself; the awareness has to include a sense of 
how this act constitutes a part of the overall context.17 Roberta Arnold, however, 
argues that the nature of terrorism as such necessarily promote a particular policy, 
and, therefore, should be rather easy to fit within the subjective prerequisite.18 This 
overall policy does not have to be promoted by a state; it is enough that the actor is 
                                                 
14 Such as SC res 1456, January 20, 2003. 
15 Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, Rome Statute, article 5. 
16 A terrorist act could, moreover, constitute a war crime in the event of an armed conflict. See n24 for 
a discussion about non-refoulement in armed conflicts. 
17 There are a vast number of case law discussing this mental element of the crime, especially from the 
ICTY and ICTR. For a further analysis, see, for instance, van den Herik, Larissa J., 2005, The 
Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
18 Arnold, Roberta, ’Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity under the ICC Statute’, in Nesi, Guiseppe 
(ed.), 2006, International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism. The United Nataions and Regional 
Organisations in the Fight Against Terrorism, Cornwall: MPG Book Ltd, p. 126. 
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powerful enough to exercise acts that are widespread or systematic.19 
It has also been questioned whether one single terrorist attack is sufficient to amount 
to being widespread or systematic. How this requirement should be interpreted is not 
obvious at all, but one way of arguing is that most international terrorist attacks 
should be seen as a part of an ongoing terrorist campaign; especially the ones that can 
be attributed to Al Qaeda. How close this nexus between different terrorist acts have 
to be, to be regarded as a policy in legal terms, is yet to be decided.20 It could also be 
argued that, for instance, the attacks of 9/11 consisted of many attacks at different 
locations, and therefore widespread enough to be considered a crime against humanity 
in itself. 21 
Consequently, one or more terrorist attacks could constitute a crime against humanity. 
As such, the perpetrator can be prosecuted before the ICC, if the responsible state is 
unable or unwilling to do so.22 
2.4 Is a legal definition of terrorism necessary? 
It is important to stress that a legal definition of terrorism does not in itself prevent the 
problems. To compare with national legislation, it is rather common that politicians 
adopt new laws to demonstrate how concerned they are. Law making is usually the 
easiest way to convince the public that the problem is being dealt with. The trouble is 
that the legal framework is merely words until it is implemented and used in practice. 
However, when it comes to regulating terrorism at the international level, the 
difficulty has not so much been to take action, but rather what action that should be 
taken. For this reason, a legal definition could affect the manners in which terrorism is 
perceived. It would not just define it as criminal matter, but also reduce the large grey 
legal areas that exist today. Furthermore, a non-existing definition leaves it open to 
the powerful states to more or less do as they please.23 
Even though close legal cooperation exists and there seems to be a consensus that 
                                                 
19, Arnold, 2006, p. 125. 
20 This is the same kind of reasoning as presented in the theory of accumulation of events, which has 
been used as an argument for pre -emptive self-defence. 
21 Arnold, 2006, p. 125. 
22 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 17(1). 
23 Sorel, Jean-Marc,” Some Questions About The Definition Of Terrorism And The Fight Against Its 
Financing”, in European Journal of International Law, 2003, Vol. 14, No. 2. 
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terrorist crimes have to be prevented, there is still an ambiguity on how this should be 
done. For many states, the judicial methods have been viewed as too limited and too 
restrictive. First of all, terrorism has been seen as a military threat, requiring armed 
reprisals and attacks. Secondly, a variety of judicial amendments and changes have 
been introduced. Both these tendencies have been heavily criticized by human rights 
advocates, politicians, scholars and civil society groups and organisations for 
interfering with fundamental human rights. 
This paper focuses on the legal implications that have arisen due to states’ attempts to 
maintain security and the consequences this has had on human rights; or more 
specifically, on the principle of non-refoulement and the risk of undermining this 
principle by the use of diplomatic assurances. Nevertheless, the war rhetoric and 
claims that the struggle against terrorism should be perceived as an armed conflict is a 
most important background for understanding the legal situation. 
3 The principle of non-refoulement – legal framework24 
The principle of non-refoulement is recognized in a number of important human right 
treaties. It is also considered to be a part of international customary law. The scope of 
the protection differs slightly in the different conventions, but the most fundamental 
meaning of the principle protects a person from being transferred, in any manner 
whatsoever, to a country where he or she could risk being subjected to torture. This 
protection is absolute, which means that if the risk is real, no exceptions are allowed. 
Thus, whether the person in question is a security risk or not does not matter. 
However, the burden of proving whether there is a real risk of subjection to torture 
lies with the returnee. Proving what might happen in the future to a particular person 
if transferred to another country is difficult as it is a hypothetical question. But once 
                                                 
24 Due to the necessity of limitations, I have excluded from this paper the discussion about non-
refoulement in armed conflicts. To keep it short, in an armed conflict International Humanitarian Law 
(jus in bello) regulates the behaviour of the parties to the conflict. However, Human Rights Law is still 
relevant and the risk of a conflict between the two systems of norms is plausible. There is an extensive 
debate how to solve this, but as a starting point, IHL should prevail due to lex specialis. Nevertheless, 
fundamental human rights, such as the principle of non-refoulement, are non-derogable even in 
situations of armed conflicts. For a further discussion about the relation between the two, see Provost, 
René, 2002, International Human Right and Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. For a further discussion about non-refoulement in IHL, see Droege, Cordula, 2008, “Transfers 
detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges”, in International Review of 
the Red Cross, Vol. 90. 
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this has been done,  
the burden falls on the state to show a cessation of circumstances which caused the 
person to seek asylum. The issue is thus not a temporary change in the State 
concerned but a genuine and lasting one there. People should not be forcibly returned 
under some special individual arrangement. What should be required is that there has 
been a proper and overall change in the State concerned.25 
Thus, according to Goodwin-Gill and Husain, finding guidance to their interpretation 
in article 1C of the Refugee Convention, if it has been established that the risk is real, 
the reasons for this risk have to be removed properly. The person cannot, therefore, be 
transferred until a genuine and lasting change of circumstances has occurred.26 
How the transfer is conducted is irrelevant. It has been argued that extradition would 
be excluded from the prohibition, at least regarding the Refugee Convention. But 
from the wordings of this convention it is quite clear that this could not be true. 
Article 33 reads: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever” (emphasis added).  Thus, this means that any kind of 
transfer is prohibited, including extradition. Moreover, in the Convention against 
Torture, extradition is expressly forbidden. 27 
3.1 Refugee Law - the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
Since many of the cases regarding the use of diplomatic assurances have included 
individuals claiming refugee status, I consider this to be a relevant starting-point. 
Non-refoulement does not only concern refugees and asylum seekers. However, these 
will most likely suffer the worst consequences if their protection from refoulement is 
undermined. The state’s obligation to provide protection to refugees, that fulfils the 
requirements of the Convention are, from a lega l perspective, quite clear. 
Nevertheless, when the focus in world politics is increasingly pointed at state security, 
refugees and asylum seekers risk being labelled as security risks, and therefore their 
protection is forfeited in the name of security. 28 For this reason, migration has been 
                                                 
25 Non-Refoulement Under Threat, Proceedings of a Seminar Held Jointly By The Redress Trust 
(Redress) And The Immigration Law Practioners' Association (ILPA), May 16, 2006, p. 11. 
26 Whether diplomatic assurances could be considered as such or not is what this paper is all about. See 
below. Article 1C in the 1951Refugee Convention regulates cessation of refugee status, stating that 
protection shall be offered as long as the reasons for it remain. 
27 For a more comprehensive discussion about non-refoulement and extradition, see Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem in Fellner, Türk and Nicholson (ed), 2003, Refugee Protection in International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122ff. 
28 See, for instance SC res. 1373. But also see the declaration annexed to SC res. 1456, adopted on 
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articulated as a security risk, and, perhaps, securitised.29 
3.1.1 Article 33 
Article 33 prohibits refoulement. It offers protection that is at the same time more 
restricted and wider than non-refoulement in most other legal documents. Firstly, the 
convention’s objective is to provide protection to those who fulfil the criteria for 
refugee status.30 Secondly, in 33(2) an explicit exemption included, stating that in the 
assessment whether protection should be granted or not, the state should also take into 
consideration the possible security risks. It reads: “The benefit of the present 
provision [article 33(1)] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in where 
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country”31. This implies that a 
weighing is intended between the refugee’s need of protection and the state’s security. 
However, the scope of the protection is also wider. The state is prohibited to “expel or 
return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened” on accounts of the same grounds as 
refugee status should be offered.32 There are many parts of the article that can be 
analysed, but for the purpose of this paper, what is important is the connection to 
refugee status. There is not enough space for an elaboration on that subject here, but 
to conclude, the protection offered has been described by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill as 
follows: 
Non-refoulement extends in principle, therefore, to every individual who has a well-
founded fear of persecution, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
her or she would be in danger of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment if returned to a particular country.33 
Of great importance for the exclusion clause in article 33(2) is how to balance the 
                                                                                                                                           
January 20, 2003, where references to HRL and refugee law are expressed. 
29 Boswell Christina, 2007, The securitisation of migration: a risky strategy for European States, 
Danish Institute for International Studies, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/diis/diis9636/index.html 
(161009). See part 2 of this paper for an elaboration on the theory of securitisation. 
30 See the Preamble of the Refugee Convention. 
31 Refugee Convention, article 33(2). 
32 Article 33 (1). The five relevant grounds identified in the Convention are: race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group and political opinion. 
33 Goodwin-Gill, 2007, The refugee in international law, third edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 234. 
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security risks to the state against the risk of torture to the individual. According to 
Goodwin-Gill, the nature of the security threat has to be determined individually in 
each and every case. Therefore, the state cannot decide that suspicion of, or a 
conviction of a particular offence or activity as such would be enough to exclude the 
person from protection. In refugee law, the international standards and the 
humanitarian intent require an individual assessment.34 For this reason, the 
seriousness of the security threat has to stand in proportion to the risk for the person 
intended to be returned.35 
This view is, however, not unquestioned. State practice as well as some doctrinal 
works implies that no proportionality test should be included.36 This means that if the 
requirements of 33(2) are fulfilled, then a transfer of the person cannot be considered 
refouler. How the two paragraphs in article 33 are related and should be interpreted is 
thus not clear. Whether or not the exception in 33(2) is absolute or not, the practice of 
some states to use particular crimes as an exclusion clause is not in accordance with 
the requirement to always make an individual assessment.37 
The protection from refoulement also includes a responsibility not to transfer a person 
to a country if there is a risk of a subsequent transfer to another unsafe country. Thus, 
article 33 prohibits indirect removal, or “chain refoulement”, where a state otherwise 
would only be responsible for what would happen in the first receiving country. 38 
3.1.2 Article 1F 
Article 33 has to be read in conjunction with article 1F. 1F stipulates that a person, for 
a few particular reasons, could be excluded from refugee status even though he or she 
otherwise fulfils the conditions. The underlying assumption is that if a person has 
committed any of the expressed acts, he or she is not worthy of protection under the 
Refugee Convention. As with any exception to protection for humanitarian reasons, it 
                                                 
34 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 118. 
35 Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp. 239-241. 
36 According to Lauterpacht, Greenwood, Lee and Oppenheimer, this interpretation also follows from 
the drafting history (the Travaux préparatoires), Lauterpacht et al (eds.), 2007, International Law 
Reports, Volume 131, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 402-406. 
37 This would also seem to show that the EU’s use of “Safe Third Countries”, where asylum-seekers 
from those selected countries are automatically returned without an individual assessment, is violating 
international refugee law. See TI v. UK, n1 above. 
38 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 122. See also the German Constitutional Court in its decision 
of May 14, 1996 (2 BvR 1938/93 and 2 BvR 2315/93). 
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has to be interpreted narrowly and the “gravity of the offence in question [should be] 
weighed against the consequences of exclusion”39. It is particularly 1F(b) and 1F(c) 
that are of importance in terrorism cases, even though a terrorist act could amount to a 
war crime or a crime against humanity, which are two of the grounds for exclusion 
under 1F(a). However, one major difference between article 1F and article 33 is that 
whereas 33(2) is supposed to exclude future threats, 1F is about limiting the 
protection for reasons of actions in the past. 1F should therefore not be used as a mean 
for state security, but only in cases where the committed acts are so grave that the 
person does not deserve refugee protection. 
Nevertheless, the exclusion clause has been revitalized because of the GWoT. In 
Resolution 1373, the Security Council stated that all states should ensure that 
terrorists do not abuse refugee status. The exclusion from refugee status can be 
devastating for the person seeking protection. For instance, the Swedish state referred 
to 1F when concluding that Agiza and El Zari should not be protected by the Refugee 
convention. 40 1F(b) excludes anyone that has committed a serious non-political crime 
outside the country of refuge before applying for refugee status. Whether terrorism 
should be considered as political acts or not is a matter of uncountable discussions, 
but most states argue that this is not so.41 Indeed, some states have explicitly declared 
that terrorism should be a reason for denial of refugee status.42 
This “mechanistic approach” is also problematic, since there is no room for an 
individual assessment. This is, as mentioned above, a corner stone in refugee law. 
Thus, even though a person has committed a terrorist crime, this should not be enough 
to be excluded as such. Each case has to be reviewed on its own terms and with all 
relevant information taken into consideration. 43 The individual assessment is even 
more important in the situation where denial is based solely on membership of an 
alleged terrorist organisation. Membership cannot, on its own, be the reason for denial 
of refugee status.44 
                                                 
39 UNHCR Guidelines No. 5 , ”Exclusion”, para. 24. 
40 The Agiza  and El Zari cases will be discussed more thoroughly below.  
41 For a further discussion about the problems of defining terrorism as non-political, see section two of 
this paper. 
42 Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp. 181f. 
43 Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp. 183f. 
44 Gilbert, Geoff, “Exclusion (Article 1F)”, in Feller, Turk and Nicholsson (eds), 2003, Refugee 
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Equally problematic is the question of where and when the crime should have been 
committed. It is absolutely clear from the wording of the article that it only applies to 
crimes committed before refugee status was granted and outside the country of refuge. 
However, there are examples where states have considered it to be in accordance with 
1F to not only deny, but withdraw refugee status for a crime committed after 
protection was given. 45 
Article 1F(c) denies refugee status for anyone who is “guilty of acts contrary to the 
purpose of and principles of the United Nations”46. Once again, whether a particular 
terrorist act falls under this provision or not has to be determined in the case at hand, 
and not by a mechanical approach. Thus, the Security Council resolution 1373, stating 
that acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purpose and principles 
of the United Nations, is not in accordance with refugee law. Another problem with 
this resolution, which was mentioned above, is that while it requires states not to 
provide refugee status for anyone engaged in terrorist activities, there is no general 
definition of what these activities consist of. The lack of a generic definition makes 
this provision extremely vague and gives the state a wide margin of appreciation. As 
Goodwin-Gill notes, “[a]rticle 1F(c) of the Convention is potentially very wide”47. 
But he continues:  
While ‘terrorism’ may indeed be contrary to the purpose and principle of the United 
Nations and therefore a basis for exclusion under article 1F(c), conformity with 
international obligations requires that decisions to exclude or subsequently to annul a 
decision of refugee status be taken in accordance with appropriate procedural 
guarantees. Article 1F(c) ought only to be applied, therefore, when there are serious 
reasons to consider that the individual concerned has committed an offence 
specifically identified be the international community as one which must be 
addressed in the fight against terrorism, and only by way of a procedure conforming 
to due process and the State’s obligation generally in international law.48 
Article 1F thus deprives a person of the protection that otherwise should have been 
granted. However, what the state should do with the person is not mentioned in the 
article. He or she is still protected by the principle of non-refoulement. This means 
that even if the state can refuse any additional responsibility, it cannot return or expel 
                                                                                                                                           
Protection in International Law, UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection , 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 470. 
45 See, for instance the case in SIAC, KK v. The Secretary of the State for the Home Department, 2004, 
UKIAT 00101. See also Goodwin-Gill, 2007, p. 171 and pp. 191f. 
46 Refugee Convention, art. 1F(c). 
47 Goodwin-Gill, 2007, p. 190. 
48 Goodwin-Gill, 2007, p. 197. 
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the person. Consequently, the alleged terrorist has the right to stay if there is a real 
risk that he or she may be subjected to torture, and even if the Refugee Convention 
does not apply, the person is still protected by all the complementary protection that 
can be found in HRL in general.  
3.2 Human Rights Law - Convention against Torture  
The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment also contains an explicit prohibition against 
refoulement. It is ratified by a great number of states and is thus an important treaty in 
the international law complex. Article 1 of the convention contains a definition of 
torture and in article 3 there is an expressed prohibition to transfer a person to a 
country where he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the ban 
of torture to function properly, no state can thus circumvent it by transferring a person 
to a country less eager to respect its international obligations.49 
The Committee against Torture (CAT) has made clear that the protection offered by 
the convention is absolute. Thus, no exceptions what so ever are to be made if the 
requirements in article 3 are fulfilled. This means that the question of state security is 
irrelevant.50 
3.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICCPR, together with ICESCR, are probably the most important human rights 
treaties. ICCPR also provides a prohibition on torture in article 7. The covenant does 
not, however, contain an explicit provision of non-refoulement, but according to The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), the non-refoulement obligation is inherent in article 
7.51 The Committee has also stated that the protection should be indirect, so that 
“chain refoulement” is not allowed.52 
3.4 European Convention on Human Rights 
As in the ICCPR, the ECHR contains a ban on torture, in article 3, but it has no article 
on non-refoulement. This prohibition could however be found in the case law of the 
                                                 
49 Still at risk , Report by Human Right Watch, 2005, p. 8. 
50 Tapia Paez v. Sweden, Communication No. 39/1996, April 28, 1997. 
51 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 20 (1992). 
52 UN human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 (2004). 
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In Chahal v. United Kingdom53 the court 
concluded that non-refoulement is an integral part of article 3. The court also made 
clear that the prohibition is absolute. Hence, there is no room left for proportionality 
or reasoning about whether the person is a security risk. In the same judgement, the 
court also stated that the protection is equally va lid if the threat of torture emanates 
from non-state agents, and that it is not enough that the assuring state acts in good 
faith in terms of securing the person, if it is not actually capable of providing effective 
protection. The necessary assessment concerns whether the risk is real or not. 
3.5 Customary international law 
The widespread ban on torture in international treaty law and the practice of states to 
regard torture as unacceptable has formed a compelling, jus cogens, rule of 
international customary law. This means that all states are bound by the ban on torture 
whether they have signed and ratified relevant conventions or not. It is also a crime of 
universal jurisdiction and has an erga omnes character. This means that all states have 
not just an obligation to refrain from conducting it, they are also obliged to prevent 
torture wherever it is committed. 
Because of this very strong and undisputed norm, the prohibition against non-
refoulement is also considered forbidden under international customary law. Like the 
courts and committees have argued (as mentioned above), the prohibition against 
torture should not be able to be circumvented by outsourcing torture to other states. It 
has even been argued that non-refoulement too should be considered a jus cogens 
norm.54 However, this does not seem to be the most common understanding today. 
3.6 Limitation and derogation 
Human Rights are not only questioned from a theoretical perspective and undermined 
by state practice. Neither from a judicial point of view are they absolute; they could 
either be subject to derogations or limitations. Limitations are clearly expressed in the 
relevant article as to how and under what circumstances this particular right can be 
limited. It also has to serve a legitimate purpose and be necessary and proportionate in 
                                                 
53 Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 70/1995/576/662, November 15, 1996. 
54 Alain Jean, ”The Jus Cogens Nature of Nonrefoulement”, in International Journal of Refugee Law, 
2001, vol. 13. 
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relation to that purpose. Derogation, on the other hand, is a temporary suspension of a 
particular obligation. For instance, a state might find it necessary to derogate from the 
prohibition on arbitrary detention and arrestment, in case of a public emergency. 55 
This is not prohibited per se, but there are several conditions that have to be fulfilled 
for this to be valid.56  
However, some human rights are non-derogable.57 All jus cogens norms are of such 
character, but it could also be explicitly expressed in the relevant article. The absolute 
character of non-refoulement against torture, as described above, has been affirmed by 
CAT, ECtHR and HRC. Thus, the only expressed limitation to non-refoulement can 
be found in the Refugee Convention. This could, in some cases, mean that a transfer 
of a person to a country where he or she might face persecution would be in 
accordance with international law. Then again, since the protection against non-
refoulement where the person is risking to be subjected to torture, is absolute 
according to HRL, non-refoulement in those situations is indeed non-derogable and 
without exclusions.58 
4 But under attack? 
The principle of non-refoulement and its validity has been questioned many times. In 
a refugee law perspective, this has for instance happened in situations of mass refugee 
influx, i.e. large-scale movements of people crossing the border to a country to seek 
protection. 59 States have in these cases argued that rejection at the border would no t 
amount to refoulement. This claim has, however, always been opposed by UNHCR 
and other actors.60 As mentioned above, neither is it a proper understanding that 
extradition would be excluded from the prohibition against refoulement. 
                                                 
55 ICCPR, article 9. 
56 ICCPR, article 4. 
57 Lemmens, P, ’Respecting Human Rights in the Fight against Terrorism’, in Fijnaut, Cyrille, 
Wouters, Jan and Naert, Frederik (eds.), 2004, Legal Instrument in the Fight Against International 
Terrorism, A Transatlantic Dialogue, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
58 Bruin and Wouters, 2003. See also Promotion and protection of human rights. Protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, report by The UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, E/CN.4/2005/103. 
59 Two illustrating examples are the 1981 US Haitian interdiction programme and the Turkish threat to 
close its borders for Iraqian Kurds 1991. See Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp. 246ff and pp. 242f. 
60 See UNHCR: The scope of international protection in mass influx, 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cc018.html (visited 211009) and Hathaway, James, 2005, The Rights of 
Refugees under International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 360. 
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4.1 A balancing act 
Nevertheless, as a result of perceived terrorist threats, a number of governments have 
made reservations to the absolute nature of non-refolument. They claim that there is a 
need for exceptions or a more flexible interpretation of the prohibition, taking state 
security into consideration. What they argue is that since the government is 
responsible for the security of its citizens, this sometimes has to prevail over the rights 
of the individual; particularly due to the fact that security also could be understood as 
a human right. From this perspective, different kinds of human rights sometimes 
collide and the only solution is to balance them against each other. 
These arguments were presented before ECtHR in the cases of Saadi61 and Ramzy62. 
Even though the court clearly rejected this view, it has provided the governments with 
arguments by referring to terrorism as a violation of human rights.63 States have also, 
as aforementioned, claimed that this would be in accordance with their obligations put 
on them by the Security Council in resolutions such as 1373.64 Thus, there seem to be 
a tendency towards arguing that the absolute prohibition has to be made relative, so 
that states can ensure their citizens protection. This view has also been supported by a 
Working document by the European Commission claiming that there are reasons to 
change the nature of non-refoulement and that a balancing act might be necessary. 65 
4.2 National case law 
The standpoint that non-refoulement has to be weighed against other interests has in 
most cases been rejected by courts. However, there are a few, important, judgements 
demonstrating that the courts too have considered it necessary to review the character 
of the prohibition. The most discussed is the Suresh66 case from the Supreme Court in 
Canada. In this judgment, the court concluded that the individual’s human rights have 
to be weighed against other interests and obligations of the state. The court stated: 
“We do not exclude the possibility that in exceptional circumstances, deportation to 
                                                 
61 Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, February 28, 2008. 
62 Ramzy v. Netherlands, Application No. 25424/05, May 27, 2008. 
63 Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECHR, January 18, 1978, para. 149. See also Warbrick, 2004, p. 992. 
64 For instance, Sweden in the Agiza  case, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, para. 4.9. 
65 “The Relationship between Safeguarding Internal Security and Complying with International 
Protection Obligations and Instruments” (COM (2001) 743 final). 
66 Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Attorney General of Canada, 2002, SCC 
1, File No. 27790, January 11, 2002. SIAC’s position will be discussed more thoroughly below. 
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face torture might be justified”67. The expression “exceptional circumstances” 
indicates that exclusions from the protection should only be used when absolutely 
necessary. Nonetheless, it is a distinct change of reasoning compared to the 
understanding that the prohibition is absolute. 
The absolute nature of non-refoulement has also been challenged by the United 
Kingdom Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), for example in a 
decision from 2007.68 SIAC herein criticized the Chahal case for not allowing a more 
flexible interpretation of the prohibition. 
Even though these are judgements from national courts, they are important because of 
how the courts have reasoned and very illustrating examples of how courts too are 
affected by general changes in the public opinion. Furthermore, national case law is 
an important source of information when refugee and human rights issues are 
analysed. The judgements do not have any kind of international precedence and are 
not directly affecting international law, but they can, at least indirectly, affect the 
opinion juris. Moreover, most legal conflicts are solved on a national level, and this 
case law usually reflects the status of human rights in general. 
4.3 What to do? 
Why is it, then, that states react like this and start questioning the absolute character 
of non-refoulement? One does not need a law-degree to answer that rather naïve 
question: terrorism is a security threat in many states and states do have a 
responsibility to protect their citizens.69 Human rights are not rights for an abstract 
idea of the individual, but for real and existing persons. Thus, human rights are worth 
nothing if those persons are dead. Or as Michael Ignatieff puts it: “A democracy has 
no more important purpose than the protection of its members, and rights exists to 
safeguard that purpose. Civil liberty, the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court has 
written, means the liberty of a citizen, not the abstract liberty of an individual in the 
                                                 
67 Suresh , para 78. 
68 DD and AS v. The Secretary of the State for the Home Department, SC/42 and 50/2005, April 27, 
2007. This decision was, however, appealed and rejected by the court of appeal. See below. 
69 Lemmens argues that this obligation can be derived from a number of documents, by for instance the 
UN General Assembly, HRC and the Council of Europe. Lemmens, 2004, p. 224. 
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state of nature”. 70 
4.3.1 Aut dedere aut judicare 
Therefore, a government has to act if it suspects terrorist activities. However, the 
question is how it should, and could, act. A starting-point is the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare, extradite or prosecute. A state that harbours a fugitive should 
either prosecute or surrender the fugitive to the state where he or she is wanted. The 
preferred option is usually to extradite the person since in most situations it is easier 
and better to investigate and prosecute the act in the country where it was 
committed.71  
However, the principle of non-refoulement sometimes prohibits extradition and in 
those situations prosecution is the only option. 72 The problem is that the nature of 
terrorist activities can make it very complicated to carry out a trial and reach a 
conviction through normal criminal proceedings. There are a number of problems 
with indictments of terrorist crimes. Firstly, the lack of an international generic 
definition makes extradition problematic, since most extradition agreement contains 
requirements of double criminality and exceptions for political crimes. This means 
that the activity has to be criminal in both states and that the sending state can refuse 
to extradite if it considers the crime political. It also obstructs prosecution in the state 
where the suspect is located, if the activity is criminal in the state that wants the 
person extradited, but not in the state of refuge. Thus, this state has no grounds to 
prosecute the person.  
Secondly, security threats are necessarily about trying to predict the future, whereas 
criminal charges are for acts already committed. The person might be suspected to be 
                                                 
70 Ignatieff, Michael, 2004, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Princeton University 
Press, p. 2. 
71 This discussion concerns the situation where a person is suspected of a crime in one country but 
resides in another. This is how the situation might be if the person is accused of terrorism, for example 
in the Agiza  case (see below). However, the alleged terrorist might not be accused of any crime, but 
still considered a safety threat. In those situations, the state have to prosecute or expel the person, but 
this too could be hindered by the obligation not to refoule. 
72 Or, rather, the only realistic option. The government could, of course, do nothing, but this  is hardly a 
good choice. Another alternative that has been tried is so called indefinite detention, i.e. locking the 
person up without a proper trial and without a specified time limit. This is, however, an infringement of 
most human rights treaties. Finally, like all suspected, the alleged terrorist could be kept under 
surveillance by the police, and even though this is how many states act, this is usually not considered as 
safe enough. 
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a major threat to security even though no crime has been committed yet, and since 
prosecution for predicted criminality is not a custom in the rule of law, just being a 
threat might not be enough. 
Thirdly, terrorist crimes can be very hard to prove. Many a times, the evidence is 
obtained from other states (especially the requesting one) and it usually concerns 
issues considered to be matters of state security, and for this reason classified 
information. If this evidence were to be used in normal criminal proceedings it would 
have to be revealed to the public and this is something that most states could not 
accept. Thus, in some cases it might both be impossible to prosecute or to extradite 
the person for prosecution. What, then, should the state do? 
5 Diplomatic assurances 
5.1 Background 
One proposed solution to the problem of respecting the individual’s human rights 
while also maintaining state security has been to obtain so called diplomatic 
assurances. The idea is that the receiving state assures that the transferred person will 
not be subjected to torture. This promise or agreement73 is said to remove the risk of 
torture, and a transfer would therefore not be infringing the prohibition to refouler. 
The decisive factor is if the assurance manages to reduce the risk enough. 74 For this to 
be done, something extra most be added. All states are bound by the prohibition on 
torture. If a diplomatic assurance is used to prevent torture, an extra layer of 
protection most be added on top of the already existing norms. 
This method have been used on several occasions, both as a single promise in one 
particular case, on an ad hoc basis, and in a more systematic way where a kind of 
agreement between two states regulates future transfers from one state to the other, 
and wherein the receiving state assures not to torture the people concerned. The 
second approach is often referred to as memoranda of understanding (MOU). 
The practice of seeking assurances is a rather old custom and not a new method 
invented to manage the terrorist threat. Two illustrating examples are provided by 
                                                 
73 The legal nature of an assurance, whether it should be considered a promise or a legally binding 
agreement, is discussed below. 
74 Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, July 7, 1989, para. 98. 
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Eric Metcalfe.75 The first tells about Lord Derby in UK, who, in 1876, refused to 
allow the extradition of a person wanted for forgery in US, unless the American 
government would provide assurances that he would only be tried for this offence, 
and nothing else. The US rejected this request, and thus, the man where never 
extradited. The second example tells the story of 35 000 Jews that that were 
transferred from Slovakia to Poland in 1942. Along with the transfer, the Slovakian 
government asked for a humane and decent treatment of them. This wish was assured 
by Eichman before the removal. The Slovakian government continuously requested to 
be able to visit the Polish ghettos to make sure that the Jews were treated in 
accordance with the assurance. When Eichman, after a few months, finally answered 
the Slovakian representative, he declined the request and said that most of the Jews 
where no longer alive.76 
It is, perhaps, a bit unfair to compare this last example to the assurances issued today. 
But it does, indeed, illustrate how important it is to judge the validity of the promise 
or agreement by its context. One cannot claim to have fulfilled one’s obligations just 
by relying on an assurance not to torture; the assurance can only be relied on if there 
are reasons for that. 
5.2 Diplomatic assurances and capital punishment 
Diplomatic assurances have often been used in situations where one state, in which 
death penalty is used, request for the extradition of a person from a state where it has 
been abolished. However, there are some important differences between assuring not 
to execute a specific punishment, considered perfectly legal in the receiving state, in a 
particular situation, and to assure not to torture. Firstly, as mentioned, capital 
punishment is an acceptable penalty in many parts of the world, whereas torture is 
strictly forbidden according to more or less all legal systems. There is no ban on the 
death penalty in international law in contrast to torture. Thus, if there is a suspicion 
that torture is practised, the receiving government is supposed to promise to refrain 
from something it is already prohibited to do. 
Moreover, no governments ever admit the use of torture. This is something that takes 
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place in the dark. Therefore, monitoring the treatment is extremely difficult and the 
receiving state will most definitely deny any occurrence. Consequently, using 
diplomatic assurances to avoid torture is very different from agreeing not to execute a 
death penalty. 
5.3 Conducted secretly 
As mentioned above, diplomatic assurances are an old custom, but it has been 
resorted to increasingly because of the GWoT; in particular to enable transfers even 
though there is a suspicion of torture in the receiving state. However, it is very hard to 
get to know any details about the assurances and the transfers, since they usually are 
conducted in secrecy. Torture and removals are seldom discussed openly by states, 
and when combined with diplomacy the situation turns even more clandestine. 
5.3.1 The cases of Agiza and El Zari 
An illustrating example is the assurance that Sweden received from Egypt before the 
deportation of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El Zari, wherein Egypt assured that the 
men’s human rights would be respected. This transfer has been widely criticized for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the two men were never informed about the accusations 
against them and had no means to appeal the decision to expel them.77 Secondly, the 
way the transfer was exercised has been criticized both from a Swedish and an 
international legal perspective for the use of excessive force and the involvement of 
American CIA agents, but also because of the haste in which the deportation was 
conducted.78 Thirdly, the Swedish government tried its best to prevent the 
investigation by the journalists which revealed the whole case to the public, by 
classifying important information and supposedly also by misleading them.79 
Fourthly, the Swedish government did not admit to the CAT that the men had been 
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tortured, even though Agiza’s testimony about having been tortured was part of the ir 
own classified report. 
Sweden was later declared in breach of its obligation to cooperate with the committee, 
art. 22, by not revealing all relevant information. 80 The Swedish government defended 
this stand by, inter alia, arguing that a public release of the information could have 
led to reprisals against Agiza in Egypt. If this is not an obvious indication that Egypt 
should not be trusted, one could wonder how low the standards of protection from 
torture should be. 
4.3.2 Diplomacy 
These cases will be discussed further below, but the examples clearly show the 
problems with the lack of information when states resort to diplomatic assurances. 
This should, however, not come as a surprise. Diplomacy is by nature an art 
conducted in secret. For this reason, agreements stemming from diplomatic 
discussions and meetings are difficult to rely on, and from a legal perspective they 
should not be considered effective safeguards against torture. 
Diplomacy is not only secretive. Another important setback when relying on 
diplomacy for the protection of human rights has to do with its purpose. As described 
by Human Rights Watch: “Diplomats are often quite candid that their top priority is to 
ensure friendly relations with other states, sometime at the expense of confronting 
governments about possible human rights violations, including about breaches of pre-
agreed diplomatic assurances”81. Or, as Agiza’s counsel put it before CAT: “Human 
rights protection is not amenable to diplomacy”82. Thus, if the protection of an 
individual’s human rights requires the exposure of acts such as torture in the receiving 
state, the risk of undermining the friendly relationship between the states might affect 
the sending state to prioritise a good relation. 
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5.4 Legal nature  
How the assurances are constructed and what they contain differs a lot. It could either 
be a single assurance for one particular situation, or a more general agreement 
between two states regulating all removals. As mentioned above, the assurance 
Sweden obtained from Egypt was limited to the two persons which were about to be 
transferred just then. The British government has, as an alternative, negotiated with 
Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon and Libya and concluded so called memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs), which could be described as a framework agreement 
stipulating a mutual understanding that human rights shall be respected when a person 
is transferred from one state to the other. 
One important issue is whether diplomatic assurances should be considered a treaty or 
not, according to international law standards. The reason for this is that if the 
assurance is determined to be a treaty, it will be legally binding for the parties. On the 
other hand, the assurance could be considered a mere promise with no legal affects 
whatsoever. 
5.4.1 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
To determine the character of an assurance, we have to turn to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and the interpretations of the convention in the 
International Law Commission's Draft Articles83 and in the case law of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)84. The decisive element is not the title of the 
agreement or how it is referred to, but the intent of the parties. If the intent is that the 
agreement shall be “governed under international law”85, it is a legally binding treaty.  
Whether diplomatic assurances should be perceived as hard or soft law is debated. For 
instance, Noll argues that non-binding agreements would be meaningless. As 
mentioned above, what is decisive is whether the risk of torture is removed or not. 
According till Noll, this risk assessment is only affected if the assurance is actually 
binding for the parties.86 Otherwise, the transfer is yet another violation of the human 
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rights law already proved too ineffective in these situations. This conclusion is 
supported by Larsaeus, who, while criticizing Noll's reasoning, agrees on the fact that 
the assurances have to be considered legally binding: 
The fact that the nature of the arrangement, as a legally binding agreement or a 
political 'understanding', is seemingly up to the parties' discretion raises serious 
issues in relation to the fundamental requirement of legal certainty. The better view, I 
suggest, is that an assurance must, at a minimum, be unequivocally binding as law 
for it to provide an added value.87 
Thus, it cannot be left to the parties themselves to interpret the agreement, since this 
undermines the safeguards provided by it. For a diplomatic assurance to reduce the 
risk of torture enough to be resorted to when there is a suspicion that torture would 
otherwise occur, the assurance has to be legally binding. 
5.4.2 Political pressure 
This view is, however, questioned. It has been argued that diplomatic assurances 
should be seen as a non-binding agreement, solely putting political pressure on the 
receiving state to fulfil its obligations. Even though the prohibition on torture has the 
character of erga omnes, an obligation towards the whole world community, this is 
considered too vague to prevent states from practice torture. The practice of torture in 
some states is well known, and it is obvious that other, powerful states could have 
used their political influence to prevent this habit. However, if the responsibility is no-
one’s in particular, but all states’, it might be that it is too generally constructed to 
have an impact. 
If, on the other hand, a state suspected of practising torture assures another particular 
state not to torture a particular person, the political pressure should, according to this 
perspective, be higher.  This has, for instance, been argued by the British government, 
to be a reason why their MOU with Algeria should allow for the return of an Algerian 
citizen, even though Algeria is known to practice torture.88 This argument was 
accepted by SIAC, which also reaffirmed this conclusion in respect to UK’s MOU 
with Jordan: 
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The answer here […] is precisely that it is bilateral, and is the result of a longstanding 
and friendly relationship in which there are incentives on both sides to comply once 
the agreement was signed. The failure to of those who regard these arrangements as 
unenforceable, in some asserted but not altogether realistic comparison with 
international human rights agreements, is a failure to see them in their specific 
political and diplomatic context, a context which will vary from country to country.89 
Then again, nothing has prevented the UK from using its political power to prevent 
either Algeria or Jordan from practising torture previously. Why this, all the sudden, 
would be of such importance, is, perhaps, a bit uncertain. 90 Turning instead to the case 
law of the ECtHR, it too has concluded that each and every case has to be determined 
on its own merits and that all relevant factors have to be regarded. Thus, a non-
binding diplomatic assurance should be taken into account in risk assessment as well 
as a legally binding. However, it seems like the court’s understanding of what is a 
sufficient assurance to eliminate the risk of torture is somewhat stricter than SIAC’s91, 
and ECtHR has not yet discussed the legal nature of diplomatic assurances.  
5.4.3 Non-binding because of their content? 
The United Nations Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Robert K. Goldman, and the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, also considers 
diplomatic assurances not to be legally binding, since they lack mechanisms for 
enforcement and sanctions if violated.92 This is also the view of Goodwin-Gill and 
Raza Husain, arguing that “diplomatic assurances effectively add nothing to the 
receiving States’ obligations, while in no way diminishing those of the sending 
State”93. The receiving state is already bound by the a non-derogable prohibition on 
torture, and the sending state is obliged not to return a person to a country where there 
is a real risk of torture, whatever that state assures. Even though they seem to agree 
with governments that diplomatic assurances should be considered non-binding, their 
conclusions are contradictory. Whereas the governments argue that the assurances 
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should be given weight anyhow, these experts see this as a reason to dismiss the 
method completely. 
In my view, the assurance does not offer much of a protection or added value if it is 
not legally binding. Even though political pressure and friendly relations can affect a 
state’s behaviour to the extent that the risk of torture is diminished, this is hardly 
sufficient to reduce the risk enough. As will be discussed further below, all the 
problems contained in a diplomatic assurance – such as monitoring, enforcement, 
denial, the lack of motivation to expose any breaches – cannot be resolved if the legal 
status of the agreement is uncertain. Furthermore, the assurance has to contain more 
obligations than solely reiterating provisions in HRL the parties are already bound by. 
But this is, perhaps, more of a normative discussion, arguing what status the 
assurances should have to be given any weight in the risk assessment. Or, the de lege 
ferenda perspective. What status diplomatic assurances de facto have, de lega lata, is 
yet to be determined. 
5.5 Endorsing or rejecting the method 
Diplomatic assurances have been discussed a lot, by academics, courts and 
committees, NGOs and state representatives. It is rather clear that while most NGOs 
and human rights advocates consider them to violate international law per se, many 
states see them as an important and useful, if yet somewhat problematic, tool for 
balancing their conflicting responsibilities. In the academic debate, states have been 
criticized for resorting to diplomatic assurances too easily and without enough control 
mechanisms. It has been claimed that many states have been willing to transfer 
alleged terrorists whatever the consequences and that the assurance has not been 
constructed as a proper protection, but rather a formal justification. 94 On the contrary, 
it has also been argued that diplomatic assurances “may establish the efficient 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are currently missing in the multilateral 
system of human rights”95. 
Most attention has been focused on how to construct an assurance that ensures that 
none of the involved states violates their obligations and that the returnee’s rights are 
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properly respected. However, equally important is the risk that the use of diplomatic 
assurances undermines the international absolute prohibition on torture. Both these 
issues have to be considered when the consequences of the assurances are analysed. 
5.5.1 Promoting the use 
Yet again, and not very surprisingly, it is especially governments that endorse the use 
of diplomatic assurances. They are the ones responsible for state security and are 
therefore most eager to reduce the threat from terrorism. The former Prime Minister 
of UK, Tony Blair, has been one of the most engaged proponents for the method. 
Firstly, he has declared that “the rules of the game are changing”96. Secondly, in the 
case of Youssef v. Home Office97, concerning four Egyptian men, Blair intervened a 
number of times, for example demanding that the Home Office should “get them 
back”98. He also in inquired, next to the assurances the Home Office had requested 
from the Egyptian government: “This is a bit much. Why do we need all these 
things?”99. 
The Swedish government has, too, defended its use of diplomatic assurances. It has 
on a number of occasions declared that the two Egyptians, Agiza and El Zari, should 
not be granted permission to return to Sweden100, and that Sweden has no 
responsibility for the treatment of the two men after the expulsion. 101 Sweden was 
also one of the states initiating an inquiry, after the affects of the assurances from 
Egypt had been known to them, to the Council of Europe Steering Committee for 
Human Rights, asking it to work out guidelines for the use of diplomatic assurances. 
The Committee, however, declined the request, since it was afraid that “such an 
instrument could be seen as weakening the absolute nature of the prohibition on 
torture or as a Council of Europe legitimisation of the use of diplomatic 
assurances”102 and that “it could also be seen as an inducement to resort to diplomatic 
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assurances”103. 
An underlying assumption in the governments reasoning is the fact that the threat is 
supposed to diminish by the removal of the alleged terrorist. However, why the state 
security is increased by putting the person in the hands of another government is 
usually not explained. One could assume that it would be harder to keep the person’s 
activities under surveillance outside the state’s border. But the government is perhaps 
fully aware that the person will be taken care of in ways not allowed in the sending 
state. “The efficiency of the measure rests on the presumption that removed persons 
will be apprehended upon return – in other words that another country assumes the 
role that the judicial system in [the sending state] would not have permitted”104. 
Or, as Noll puts it: 
[A]ccording to US intelligence officials, captured terrorists were rendered over to 
coalition partners for interrogation, not so much for their coercive techniques as for 
the cultural affinities that enable them to reach out and induce, or goad, the captives 
into talking. Taking this argument at face value (and leaving aside the reduction of 
judicial monitoring for a moment), it would imply that rendition is about moving the 
captives to an ‘appropriate’ cultural context, where a ‘proper’ interrogation may take 
place. It would further confirm that the coalition’s security services lack the 
capability to conduct such interrogations in a satisfactory manner, for whatever 
reasons. Alternatively, an essentialist edge can be added, pushing the limits of the 
argument: multicultural societies have failed when captives need to be rendered to an 
‘originary’ setting in Egypt or Syria.105 
The governments’ endorsement of diplomatic assurances has in some situations been 
accepted by the courts. In the Abu Qatada case in SIAC106, discussed above, the court 
obviously considered the assurances to be enough. This is a view that SIAC has 
adopted in general regarding the British MOUs. 
5.5.2 Concerns 
As aforementioned, the human rights advocates and NGOs which argue that 
diplomatic assurances are not legally binding are also doubtful to the use of it. 
Concerns about the effectiveness of the assurances have been articulated by quite a 
number of scholars, whereof Goodwin-Gill, Noll, Larsaeus, Matcalfe and Borg have 
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already been mentioned. Except for the discussion about the assurances’ legal status, 
the concerns expressed have mainly focused on the problems of: (1) trust, (2) denial, 
(3) monitoring, (4) enforcement, (5) remedies and (6) incentives to reveal a violation. 
1. Trust. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-
Robles, has declared that: “The weakness inherent in the practice of 
diplomatic assurances lies in the fact that where there is a need for such 
assurances, there is clearly an acknowledged risk of torture”107. This is also 
what most NGOs and human rights advocates argue: diplomatic assurances 
are based on trust where there are no reasons for such trust. A state that 
previously has been violating the non-derogable prohibition on torture is not 
likely to start respecting it because of yet another document reiterating its 
obligations. “The factual backdrop for assessing assurances is, therefore, not 
simply the fact that Algeria et al have used torture, but that they have 
continued to do so for many years in breach of their international obligations, 
and in the face of international opprobrium for having done so”. 108 
With respect to the absence of a trustworthy history, this is why the content of 
the assurance is of such weight. Creating a diplomatic assurance that truly 
removes the risk of torture upon removal is most definitely a complicated 
matter. Nonetheless, I agree with Larsaeus in that it would be premature to 
reject assurances as such, based solely on this difficulty.109 If constructed as 
legally binding agreements, including enough safeguards to prevent a real risk 
of torture, diplomatic assurances could offer sufficient protection. This is also 
the view of most courts and committees. However, there are many issues that 
need to be solved. 
2. Denial. Closely related to the problems of trusting the state party, is the 
incentive to deny the practice of torture. Since torture is strictly forbidden 
there are no states that ever admit the use of it. The claims of torture in the 
cases of Agiza and El Zari were for example denied immediately by Egypt. 
SIAC, in case of BB, described the Jordanian authorities as “men of 
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honour”110, implying that they are to be trusted and that this therefore would 
be sufficient. A similar argument was proposed by Sweden before CAT: 
“failure to honour the guarantees would impact strongly on other similar 
European cases in future”111. Contrary to SIAC, CAT did not accept this as 
sufficient. ECtHR has also made clear that even if the risk of torture is not 
denied, the sending state cannot accept an assurance on the bases of “good 
faith”. It does not matter whether the receiving state is in good faith or not 
regarding its ability to provide sufficient protection if the risk in fact is real 
anyhow. 112 
3. Monitoring. Because of the lack of trust and the probability that a breach of 
the agreement would be denied, monitoring the treatment of the transferred 
person is of great importance. A proper protection depends to a high degree on 
how well- functioning the mechanism for monitoring is. Most states are 
reluctant to let other state’s officials interfere with their internal affairs and 
letting external personnel monitor the treatment of the returnee can thus be 
complicated. 
However, there are also many problems with how to detect torture. Firstly, 
physical signs of torture are not always easy to see. Therefore, it is not 
sufficient to let just any diplomat meet the returnee; he or she has to be 
examined by a person with enough knowledge of what to look for. Secondly, 
the meetings have to be confidential and not be monitored by the receiving 
state. Thirdly, torture is not necessarily officially sanctioned. Therefore, all 
stages and people involved in the transfer have to be monitored. Fourthly, 
there is a risk that the returnee and/or his or her family are threatened. For this 
reason, he or she may be reluctant to tell of any torture for the fear of 
reprisals.113 
The example of Agiza illustrates all of these issues well. The assurance did 
include a right for the Swedish ambassador to visit Agiza in prison. However, 
it took five weeks before the first meeting. Sweden claimed the reason for this 
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long period to be that they wanted to show Egypt that there was a mutual trust. 
As just mentioned, whether Egypt should be trusted in that kind of situation is 
questionable. The ambassador did not get to meet Agiza alone; there were 
always Egyptian officials present. Finally, Sweden was apparently not able to 
detect any traces of torture, even though Agiza later witnessed that he had be 
subjected to it.114 Whether the reason for this was improper monitoring or a 
lack of interest to reveal any suspicion that torture had occurred (which will be 
discussed more below), is hard to tell. But one conclusion that could be drawn 
is that the monitoring process has to be conducted by a third, impartial, actor. 
This is, nevertheless, something that has to be regulated by the two states. 
4. Enforcement. Another problem with the assurances that have been resorted to 
is the absence of any kind of enforcement. How to deal with a violation of the 
agreement cannot be left out. As aforementioned, SIAC did not find this to be 
a necessary requirement in the British MOUs.115 However, since the receiving 
state cannot be trusted, and the consequences for the returnee are so grave if 
the agreement is breached, the agreement has to include a clause for how it 
can be enforced. This was just as clear in the Agiza case, where Sweden have 
not shown any interest in trying to enforce the agreement. The Swedish 
answer has, instead, been that they do no longer have any responsibilities for 
Agiza.116 
5. Remedies. Closely connected to the need of a possibility to enforce the 
agreement, is the issue of remedies. The parties to the agreement are two 
states. However, the one suffering from a violation is the returnee. Therefore, 
he or she must be offered some kind of measure for how to impeach both 
states in case of an infringement. The returnee should also have the right to 
some kind of remedies in such a situation. This has not been subject to 
discussion in any of the assurances used in practice. Quite the contrary, the 
returnee has not been regarded a subject in the agreement.117 
                                                 
114 Joseph, Sarah, ”Rendering Terrorists and the Convention Against Torture”, in Human Rights Law 
Review, 2005, Vol. 5 No. 2. 
115 n85. 
116 n97.  
117 This is, indeed, a problem for the nature of human rights in general. The traditional subjects in 
  
41 
6. Disclosure. A major problem is the absence of an incentive to disclose a 
breach of the agreement. The receiving state will, for natural reasons, not 
expose any practice that not only violates the agreement, but legal obligations 
in general. And the sending state would cast a light upon its own disrespect of 
the principle of non-refoulement by unveiling the receiving state’s practice of 
torture. As mentioned under “monitoring”, the issue of disclosure, too, shows 
the necessity of an impartial actor's involvement. 
A brief look at the situations where diplomatic assurances have been resorted to 
clearly shows that even the ones that have included provisions regarding most of these 
issues have failed to offer good enough protection. Therefore, the practice of 
diplomatic assurances has not been sufficient for avoiding torture and, consequently, 
the sending state has been violating its obligation not to refoule.  
Nevertheless, the shortfall of the assurances used this far, cannot rule out their 
practice as such. A reason why assurances, perhaps, could be resorted to, is the 
possibility of an inclusion of mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. This is 
usually a problem in international law in general, and particularly in HRL; many are 
the rights and obligations, but the example of torture explicitly demonstrates its 
deficiencies. Consequently, a diplomatic assurance could actually offer better 
protection for the returnee than ordinary HRL. However, this can only be true if all 
the above-mentioned issues are properly dealt with, and with an actual intent to be 
upheld. Important to stress, is, thus, that the assurances must include other provisions 
than solely reiterating the receiving state’s obligations stemming from its own legal 
system or international conventions. Since the state concerned is already breaching 
the ban on torture, which it is bound by not only internationally, but usually also in 
domestic law, a diplomatic assurance must provide additional protection. 
5.5.3 Case Law 
This is has also been the courts’ and committees’ perspective. No court or committee 
have yet declared that diplomatic assurances cannot be used because of their violation 
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of non-refoulement. Rather, the assurances have been viewed as one fact out of many, 
affecting the risk assessment for the person concerned. To be able to judge whether 
the assurance constitutes sufficient protection or not, one has to look at the content of 
it, but also at the subject offering the assurance. The aforementioned criteria are what 
most courts and committees have found necessary to ensure, for the assurance to be of 
any use. 
The Egyptian assurance to Sweden regarding Agiza and El Zari where criticised on a 
number of points, and Sweden where therefore considered to have violated its 
obligation not to refoule by both CAT and HRC. In the Agiza case, CAT emphasised 
that “[t]he procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no 
mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest 
risk”118. This seems to imply that diplomatic assurances could offer sufficient 
protection, if they include a credible mechanism for enforcement. In the El Zari case, 
HRC concluded that a provision for enforcement was lacking and that Sweden had 
not monitored the treatment of El Zari properly. HRC also added that “the state party 
has not shown that the assurances were sufficient ‘in the present case’, to mitigate 
sufficiently the risk of torture”119. This makes it rather clear tha t diplomatic 
assurances are not declared ineffective as such by HRC. 
ECtHR, as well, has pointed out the necessity to judge the assurance in its proper 
context. In Chahal, the first case before the court concerning diplomatic assurances 
against torture, the court was not persuaded that the assurance provided sufficient 
protection. The main reasons were that torture in India was endemic and that the 
government could not sufficiently control the non-state actors that constituted the 
threat. The removal was therefore rejected and the assurances declared not sufficient. 
The next judgement by ECtHR, regarding diplomatic assurances, Matmakulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey120, has been described as an acceptation of the method. However, 
as the court clearly stated, the judgement was based on the absence of enough 
information. The applicants were not able to convince the court that they faced a real 
risk of torture. Thus, an assessment of the assurances was not necessary.  
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The most illustrating case regarding ECtHR's view on diplomatic assurances is 
probably Saadi v. Italy, decided by the Grand Chamber of the court. As described by 
Fiona de Londras: 
Although the ECtHR accepted the right of contracting states to control the entry, 
residence and expulsion of aliens from the state and confirmed that there is no 
Convention right to political asylum, it reasserted its longstanding position that state 
action relating to expulsion is restrained by the absolute nature of Article 3 and the 
implied positive obligation not to send individuals to a state where they are at real 
risk of prohibited treatment.121 
The court also recognized the states’ problem with protecting their citizens from 
terrorism as a major issue, and stressed that it could not underestimate the threat that 
terrorism presents today. Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed that the principle of non-
refoulement is absolute, meaning that no matter what kind of threat the person 
concerned poses, he or she cannot be returned if there is a real risk of torture. Thus, 
the court rejected Italy’s and UK’s – who made a third party intervention – claim that 
a balancing act between state security and protection for the individual is necessary. 
Neither did the court accept UK’s argument that the requirement of a “real risk” 
should be changed to the higher standard that it would be “more likely than not” that 
the person concerned would be subjected to torture. In its judgement, the court 
reaffirmed that the sending state violates the princip le of non-refoulement if the 
person is transferred when there is a real risk of torture.122 Once again, ECtHR 
recalled that this assessment necessarily is speculative and that the court will consider 
all relevant information. 123 The domestic law is one component, but if reliable sources 
tell of systematic practice of torture, a legal ban of it is not sufficient. Another such 
component is diplomatic assurances, which the court implied might offer sufficient 
protection in some cases. However, in this particular case, the assurances consisted of 
nothing more than references to Tunisian law. This was, according to the court, not 
enough. 124 Human Rights Watch has, furthermore, pointed to the fact that even 
though ECtHR has not rejected diplomatic assurances, there are still no cases where 
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the court has found them to offer sufficient protection. 125 
The Saadi case seems to not only have confirmed the absolute nature of non-
refoulement, is has also affected British courts in domestic judgements. In the case of 
AS & DD, mentioned above, SIAC had questioned ECtHR’s decision in Chahal, 
arguing that the threat from terrorism necessitates a balancing act. When SIAC’s 
decision was appealed, the Court of Appeal agreed with SIAC that it would be in 
interest of the Libyan government to respect the MOU with UK. However, the court 
did not find this reasoning sufficient, based on the reality “on the ground”. Thus, 
because of the lacking trustworthiness, the MOU did not contain enough safeguards to 
reduce the risk of torture.126 
5.5.4 Undermining the prohibition 
It seems like most courts and committees have not given proper consideration to the 
risk that a systematic use of diplomatic assurances could undermine the principle of 
non-refoulement. There are but a few examples. In the Agiza case, CAT claimed that: 
[I]f the Committee were to accept guarantees such as those offered in the present 
case as sufficient protection against torture, one could not discount that large scale 
deportations could take place after some standard form of assurance provided by 
States with poor human rights records.127 
The committee clearly demonstrates awareness about the problem. However, it also 
limits its concerns to the particular assurance in “the present case”, implying that this 
is not necessarily the situation for all diplomatic assurances. 
If this has not yet been scrutinised by the courts, NGOs and human rights advocates 
have highlighted it as a major issue. Human Rights Watch writes: 
The phenomenon of one state requesting that another make an exception to its 
general policy of employing torture with respect to one individual has deeply 
disturbing implications. Asking for the creation of such an island of protection come 
dangerously close to accepting to ocean of abuse that surrounds it.128 
And moreover: “Reliance upon diplomatic assurances signals an erosion of the 
absolute obligation not to return or transfer a person to a place where he or she is at 
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risk of torture or ill-treatment”129 Thus, resorting to diplomatic assurances does not 
only put the returnee in danger of being tortured, it also undermines the absolute ban 
on both torture and refoulement. Torture is therefore legitimised in two ways: firstly 
by requiring that only the returnee should not be tortured; and secondly, by returning 
a person to a country that does not fulfil its international law obligations. 
These double standards have also been acknowledged by Goodwin-Gill and Husain: 
Indeed, the practice of states […] shows up many of the contradictions inherent in the 
very idea of seeking assurances that this or that candidate for removal will not be 
tortured. This process admits that torture takes place in the prospective receiving 
country, and is likely systematic; even as the sending State seeks protection for one, 
so it acquiesces in the torture of others.130 
This is, perhaps, where the most interesting critique is focused. Even if an assurance 
could be constructed so that the returned person’s rights would be fully respected, the 
use of diplomatic assurances, and MOUs in particular, might create a parallel system, 
which undermines the absolute ban on torture for some people. This would result in 
that there is one system of international law protecting people from torture and the 
return to a country where they might face it, and another set of rules for alleged 
terrorists. Theo van Boven, UN’s Special Rapporteur on Torture, has asked “whether 
the practice of resorting to assurances is not becoming a politically inspired substitute 
for the principle of non-refoulement”131. 
The structural problems with diplomatic assurances could also be analysed from a 
judicial perspective. If the diplomatic assurances are to be seen as treaties, they are 
not just unlawful, but considered void, if they could be regarded as conflicting with 
the jus cogens norm against torture.132 Even if they are not considered to be directly 
conflicting with a jus cogens norm, but perhaps only indirectly with the prohibition to 
refouler, diplomatic assurances could be considered unlawful. As Larsaeus points out, 
this is because the assurance might be incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaties containing the principle of non-refoulement.133 Larsaeus argues that a 
systematic use of diplomatic assurances could undermine the protection offered by 
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non-refoulement, and thereby be incompatib le with the object and purpose of these 
treaties: 
[E]stablishing bilateral agreements that certain individuals (i.e. individuals of special 
interest to the State) shall not be mistreated can be interpreted as an acceptance of 
such treatment in other cases. If the practice of requesting diplomatic assurances 
continues to grow, thereby creating two parallel systems, one multilateral, which 
States can violate without sanctions, and one bilateral which demands detailed 
compliance, the practice of assurances could possibly be found to defy the object and 
purpose of the convention.134 
The use of diplomatic assurances may, consequently, be considered unlawful if they 
are to be seen as undermining the protection offered by treaties such as ICCPR, the 
Convention agains t Torture and the Refugee Convention. But it is important to stress 
once more, that no court or committee has yet taken this into serious consideration. 
However, this creation of a parallel system and acceptance of double standards could 
also be discussed from a more political perspective. Not only is this necessary 
because of the political nature of terrorism and counter terrorism as such. But to 
understand where this acceptance for the mistreatment comes from, and what further 
consequences it can result in, I will hereon discuss this phenomenon in a theoretical 
and political context. 
Section II - Theory135 
The theories I have chosen all have in common that they focus on how conflicts are 
dealt with in politics and what the consequences could be if conflicts are not 
acknowledged politically. The reason why I use these theories is that they are all 
relevant for understanding the connection between law and politics. Especially Noll, 
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who shows that changes in the judicial sphere are closely connected to changes in the 
political. The two processes he describes are simultaneous and influence each other. 
This also goes for the theory of securitisation, which explains the underlying process 
of how a conflict is considered so detrimental that exceptional measures are 
necessary. Mouffe and Behnke, on the other hand, describe how a similar process can 
occur if a conflict is deemed non-political. Lastly Agamben shows that the 
exceptional measures that the GWoT has justified, risk becoming permanent and 
eventually undermine the democratic system. In my view, these theories are highly 
relevant when analysing diplomatic assurances and the undermining of non-
refoulement since they portray how this is part of a structural problem, and not an 
isolated phenomenon. The theories highlight different aspects and should be seen as 
complimenting each other, but they all share a common essence: terrorism has to be 
acknowledged politically. They also stress that to understand the interplay between 
the parties to the conflicts described, the power relations have to be the focal point. 
The undermining of non-refoulement as a result of the GWoT has to be addressed 
politically, and politics is always a question of power. 
To understand what role the principle of non-refoulement play in contemporary 
international law and why states in so many situations have used methods that seem to 
undermine it, it is necessary to elaborate on the concept of security. A big number of 
states consider terrorism to be a major threat to their security. Whether this is actually 
true or not is not what I focus this paper on, the importance lay in how states perceive 
and articulate this rather recent terrorist threat. One key consequence of this increased 
focus on terrorism is the rise of maintaining and promoting secur ity as the main task 
for the state. This security-oriented perspective has, in turn, affected what methods 
many states consider to be necessary to prevent terrorism. From this perspective, the 
principle of non-refoulment poses an obstacle for the state when a person is 
considered a security threat, needed to be eliminated.  
But before I go any deeper into this discussion about security, it is crucial to analyse 
where this focus stems from. Why is it, that terrorism is talked about in this way and 
described in these terms? Furthermore, how can it be that some people, i.e. alleged 
terrorists, are deprived of basic legal and human rights in the name of security? What, 
thus, is the politics behind these changes in international law? To try to answer those 
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questions, I start out with turning to Chantal Mouffe and her theory about agonism. 
6 Mouffe 
Mouffe’s book On the political136 is a written as a criticism of the contemporary 
widespread understanding of politics. She argues that the dominating view today is 
the consensus-oriented liberalism and that this ideology is the foundation of both most 
academic theories, as well as how most states have chosen to construct their political 
system. For Mouffe, this is very problematic, since she considers this consensus 
democracy to be the root of many of the challenges the states are faced with today. 
One challenge in particular, is the increased threat from terrorism. 
First and foremost, one should not forget that liberalism has played a fundamental 
part in the development of democracy and the history of human rights. This is 
important to stress since Mouffe’s, and my, critique of it could be perceived as quite 
harsh. Liberalism is still important and can still have a substantial positive affect for 
democracy and human rights. However, there are significant deficits that have to be 
analysed and discussed. 
According to Mouffe, the liberal consensus theory has two main weaknesses: (1) It is 
based on an incorrect assumption about the political, and (2) this assumption may lead 
to dangerous consequences. The liberals postulate that the goal for politics in general 
is to achieve a harmony where all individuals can be satisfied. For this to be possible, 
all conflicts should be solved by agreements. Mouffe’s criticism centres on the idea 
that all conflicts can be solved with the result that all involved will be satisfied. This 
is, according to Mouffe, not how conflicts could, nor should, be dealt with in a 
democratic society. Conflicts are not a problem in politics, but just what constitute it. 
The society cannot be structured around supposedly impartial institutions trying to 
settle for solutions that could be liked by everyone; democracy requires proper 
options. Dialog and democracy are nothing but empty phrases if no proper 
alternatives exist. Mouffe’s conclusion is that conflicts need to be acknowledged 
politically, or they will intensify and transform into other shapes and forms.137 
This is the reason why I begin this section with an overview of Mouffe and then use 
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her theory to analyse terrorism and the responses to it. She offers a primary discussion 
about conflicts in general, whereof terrorism could be seen as one of many others. In 
my view, the GWoT is best understood and analysed if one tries to understand the 
importance of conflicts in a democratic system. A basic theory about conflicts in 
general is thus a good starting-point for later analysing the conflict behind the GWoT 
in particular. 
6.1 The liberal misunderstanding of the political 
To describe this ontological misconception, Mouffe turns to Carl Schmitt and his 
theory about the political. Mouffe explicitly distance herself from Schmitt’s 
conclusions of his theories, but argues that we need to take his criticism of liberalism, 
and his idea that antagonism is inseparable from politics, under serious consideration. 
Mouffe argues that the common view on antagonism today is that it should be 
avoided by all means, particularly within the political sphere. For Schmitt, however, 
antagonism and conflicts are the essence of politics. They should not, and could not, 
be avoided, but rather should they be acknowledged. This, though, does not mean that 
conflicts are the only way to solve political problems or that they should be 
reinforced, but that antagonism as a fundament for the political cannot be ignored.138 
Since conflicts are unavoidable, consensus is nothing more than a mere veil hiding the 
deeper disagreements in society. Or, in Mouffe’s words: “A key point of Schmitt’s 
approach is that, by showing that every consensus is based on acts of exclusion, it 
reveals the impossibility of a fully inclusive ‘rational’ consensus”. 139 Thus, for the 
idea of a fully inclusive consensus to be applicable, conflicts must be perceived as 
minor variations of opposing ideas about how to reach a mutually agreed upon goal. 
The consensus perspective describes democracy in terms of competition where 
different actors, by debating rationally, will see the advantages of the competitor’s 
arguments and eventually come up with a solution fit for everyone. 
As aforementioned, both Schmitt and Mouffe heavily oppose this simplification of 
what part conflicts play in the political system. This idea about the political is blind to 
the concept of power. For Schmitt and Mouffe, power is an essential part of almost 
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every conflict and the reason why conflicts do not have one single solution. When a 
solution to a conflict is proposed, it is necessary to understand that this is the result of 
different power relations between the actors involved. The result is not a consensus 
agreed upon by everyone, but the hegemonic definition of a consensus. The perceived 
consensus is a reflection of the hegemony, which, in turn, is based on power.140 
6.2 The problems with individualism 
One reason, according to Schmitt, why liberalism cannot grasp the political is its 
focus on the individual. Politics cannot be based on an imagined picture of an atomic 
and isolated individual, since this is not an accurate description of the human being. 
The individual can never be differentiated from its social relations; social relations 
with other individuals are what constitute the society. Since politics always take part 
in a specific society, and structuring this particular society is the objective of politics, 
the political system will be shaped by the social relations in that society. 
The consequence of all these different social relations is a creation of an imagined 
community, or, put differently, a collective defining the society. Politics, thus, 
requires collectives and collective identification processes – the creation of a “we”. 
This “we” is always produced, and reproduced, in relation to a “they”, the other that 
defines the limits of the “we”. The construction of these groups has nothing to do with 
essential commonalities. The collectives are historically and socially constructed, but 
nonetheless existing facts. This is why the collective cannot be ignored when 
discussing politics. And this is why liberalism, with its constant focus on the 
individual, is not equipped with a functioning tool to handle the political. 141 
6.3 Agonism instead of antagonism 
Unlike Schmitt, Mouffe argues that the conflict-oriented perspective of the political is 
possible to reconcile with a democratic system. According to Mouffe, conflicts do not 
necessarily result in antagonism; the point is that conflicts may do that. This is what 
one has to be aware of when conflicts are lifted up as the centre of politics. Politics 
should be about avoiding that conflicts end up in antagonism by offering them space 
within the political system. It is when conflicts are de- legitimised as being non-
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political they face the risk of intensifying into antagonism. When conflicts can be 
articulated in political terms, no collective needs to face the risk of apprehending its 
existence as being threatened. What Mouffe proposes is a middle ground between 
Schmitt’s antagonism-perspective and the liberal idea about the consensus, namely 
agonism. By this, she aims to avoid the violent potential of antagonism, as well as the 
political exclusion resulting from the desire to always reach a consensus.  
In contrast to antagonistic conflicts, agonism does not threaten the political system or 
society in itself. Agonism means that conflicts are admitted within the political 
sphere, which, thus, disarms their violent potential. Political opponents and their 
arguments are perceived as legitimate, even though all involved might never agree 
upon the best political solutions. By this, Mouffe illuminates how, in an agonistic 
democracy, the actors accept the political framework in itself, but what is always 
disputed is its content. Democracy should, according to her, be about transforming 
antagonistic conflicts into agonistic by offering legitimate political channels where 
opposing views and arguments can be expressed. Unlike the liberal consensus, 
however, agonism presupposes a fundamental questioning of the power structures in 
society. Agonism, thus, gives room for a reflexion and debate about the hegemony. 
What Mouffe proposes is a much wider definition of the political than what is 
common today and that conflicts, as far as possible, have to be addressed 
politically.142 
6.4 The dangers of consensus  
It is this process, when conflicts are de- legitimised as non-political, that Mouffe 
points out as the danger of liberalism. Ignoring conflicts will not make them 
disappear, but rather intensify them.  If conflicts are not given a political shape, they 
will take some other form; a non-political conflict is usually described in terms of 
moral. By articulating a dispute in moral terms it is given the impression of being a 
question of right or wrong. For the actor within the hegemonic perspective, the 
opposing view is therefore unacceptable. For the de- legitimised one, on the other 
hand, this exclusion comes to show how closed and unreachable the political arena is. 
For this reason, arguing politically does not seem to be an alternative. 
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6.5 A broader concept of the political 
To include conflicts within the realm of politics is, consequently, not a threat to 
democracy, but a preconception to its existence. Conflicts should neither be 
suppressed, nor should they be allowed to escalate into violence. Agonism offers a 
political perspective where conflicts do not have to be mediated and admits space to 
fundamental questionings of contemporary hegemony. A widening of the political is, 
as a result, a necessity to avoid increased antagonism. 
Liberalism’s inability to handle conflicts is thus very problematic. To de- legitimise 
alternative and conflicting opinions and ideas as non-political, does not mean that 
they disappear, but rather that they radicalise. And when conflicts are described as 
being about moral values instead of different political opinions, the gap between the 
collectives widens. The result from defining the political as an aim to reach consensus 
is, eventually, an intensification of the conflicts. Excluding conflicts do not lead to a 
peaceful settlement, but to increased antagonism. Or, as Mouffe puts it: 
There is some irony in the fact that the approach which claims that the 
friend/enemy model of politics has been superseded ends up creating 
the conditions for the revitalization of the antagonistic model of 
politics that it has declared obsolete. However, there is no denying that 
the post-political perspective, by hindering the creation of a vibrant 
agonistic public sphere, leads to envisaging the ‘they’ as ‘moral’, i.e. 
‘absolute enemies’, thereby fostering the emergence of antagonism, 
which can jeopardize democratic institutions.143 
6.6 Influencing politics 
The liberal consensus theory has had a major impact on the political systems in many 
states. Instead of increased reflexion and a wish to engage in political discussions 
there is a tendency to de-legitimise conflicts and opponents as non-political. 
Differences and disagreements are essentialised and described in terms of “us and 
them”, “right or wrong”, “with us or against us” etc. Politicians more and more refer 
to the affectionate dimension of politics and “we” as a collective is increasingly kept 
at a distance in relation to other collectives, “they”.  By distancing the collectives, 
there is less potential to accept the other’s opinions as legitimate. 
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6.7 Critique against Mouffe 
6.7.1 Mouffe and human rights 
One might argue that it is a paradox to use Mouffe’s thinking to criticize diplomatic 
assurances for undermining human rights, since Mouffe herself is criticising the 
human rights regime for being a part of the universalistic consensus claims. However, 
this paper does not set out to analyse the human rights regime as such, i.e. the nature 
of human rights, or if the concept of human rights are being used for political 
purposes.144 Even though I consider the ban on torture to be a fundamental right that 
should be seen as an absolute universal standard, and thus not be subject to any form 
of relativisation, this is my own subjective belief. What Mouffe helps us to understand 
is that diplomatic assurances are a part of a policy that divides humanity in two 
separate categories: those with rights, and those without. The importance is not 
whether these right should be called human rights, or what their nature are, but that 
states are constructing a system where some people are completely excluded from the 
principles of the Rechtsstaat. 
Thus, I am using Mouffe’s theories the same way she is using Schmitt’s: by taking 
her concerns seriously, but not necessarily have the same opinion about the solutions. 
Whether one agrees with the conclusions of Mouffe or Schmitt is not what matters, 
but that they raise alarming questions and problematise issues that are necessary to 
take in to consideration. 145 
6.7.2 What conflicts are legitimate? 
One major problem with the theory of agonism is that, while it argues that conflicts 
have to be embraced, it still limits the scope to particular conflicts. According to 
Mouffe, the actors have to accept the democratic rules and preconditions for the 
system to function. But who is to decide which those rules should be? And how 
should a fundamental questioning of the power structures in society be differentiated 
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from a de- legitimisation of the same? There are some important issues that need to be 
solved if Mouffe’s theories are to be seen as something more than a mere description 
of the contemporary political system. 
One could, however, argue that Mouffe is not offering a new understanding of 
politics, but rather a discussion about the risks with the dominating view of 
democracy. She describes the danger of some tendencies and tries to solve them by 
arguing that the democratic system needs to be re-vitalized to survive. As for the 
critique about relying on new limitations for the content of the political, I would argue 
that this stance is of course problematic, but perhaps inevitable. A political system has 
to be limited to some extent, and the problem is not the limits themselves, but how 
they are addressed. As discussed below by Behnke, in a democratic society these 
decisions have to be acknowledged as political rather than moral. 
6.7.3 The political as something more than promoting one’s self-interest 
Another critical argument is that the purpose of consensus is not necessarily to always 
agree, but should be seen as a theoretical objective for a debate. The idea about 
consensus presupposes an ideal speech situation, where everyone has the same ability 
to argue. However, this is just an ideal situation and not an empirical fact. The 
thought about this equality is that it should be the arguments that contribute to 
democratic solutions, not depending on the person arguing or other facts. This does, 
though, not mean that the proponents of consensus are not aware that power relations 
exist in reality. 
Furthermore, the wish for consensus is to some extent also included in Mouffe's 
thinking. She, too, argues that there has to be some kind of mutual acceptation of the 
basic rules in a democratic system. This is, perhaps, what the consensus liberals mean 
when they argue that the aim should be an agreement. And is it necessarily bad to 
strive for consensus when it comes to matters of fundamental importance for society? 
Being able to review an argument from a position outside one’s own is perhaps what 
makes people able to accept other people’s opinions, and therefore necessary in a 
democracy. But this can only be achieved if the actors are not always lead by their 
self- interest. Mouffe argues that groups in a society should not be understood from an 
essentialist point of view. Nevertheless, she claims that the source of the conflicts 
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derives from this kind of group thinking and that this should not only be 
acknowledged, but enhanced. 
This seems, to me, like a rather deterministic apprehension of how people are always 
guided by their self- interest and group identification, without a possibility of 
development or change. In my view, this is probably the least developed, and most 
problematic, part of the theory of anonism; even though group identities and 
collectives are fundamental for understanding the political, it is not very fruitful to 
regard them as socially given entities with no possibility to be influenced. However, 
despite a few problematic parts of the theory, Mouffe still has a lot to offer when 
trying to grasp how the perception of conflicts affects the political outcomes as a 
response to terrorism. 
6.8 Consensus and terrorism 
The theory of agonism can, despite its flaws, be helpful when it comes to analysing 
terrorism. International terrorism is usually described as a non-political issue. It is 
talked about in terms of security and moral, and the division into clearly separated 
collectives has created a wide gap between what is defined as “we” and “they”. The 
tendency to articulate terrorism as an enemy to “humanity” is used by Mouffe as an 
example to demonstrate how this process is functioning. In the Western world, the 
party in the conflict with the hegemonic power, the struggle against terrorism is 
justified with arguments that monopolise terms such as “democracy”, “civilisation” 
and “humanity”. This description of the conflict is used as an ideological weapon, 
which de- legitimises the opponent’s political claims. According to Schmitt, the 
liberals’ use of a humanitarian ethic is nothing but a cover for imperialistic expansion. 
The moralised rhetoric unmistakably transforms the opponent into an enemy with 
which no settlements whatsoever could be made. To also wage a war in the name of 
humanity means that no peace is possible before the enemy is annihilated. This kind 
of war is “particularly inhuman since all means [are] justified once the enemy [has] 
been presented as an outlaw of humanity”146. 
Schmitt wrote about an “international civil war”147 where the rules of war no longer 
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are applicable. In my view, this term responds well to how the war on terrorism is 
being waged. The alleged terrorists are not seen as legitimate parties to the conflict, 
and therefore deprived of the rights – but not the responsibilities – that should come 
with being a combatant.148 To this, Schmitt adds the resurrection of the expression the 
“just war” and the tendency to define the enemy as a criminal. This justifies the use of 
more or less any methods, as long as the enemy will be defeated. All claims from the 
enemy about either rights or political causes are completely de-legitimised. A very 
alarming result is, thus, the rise of an ethic where all means are justified by the cause. 
This is, however, something that Mouffe does not discuss at all, but which I see as 
one of the most dangerous result of this politic.149 
The principle of non-refoulement is, consequently, not particularly heavy weighting, 
when a balance is sought to be struck between security and rights fo r alleged 
terrorists. Methods such as diplomatic assurances are, as I see it, rather natural results 
of a politic that de-humanises and de- legitimises all opponents that question the 
hegemonic power. 
Terrorism should, according to Mouffe, be seen as an effect of the unipolar world we 
live in today. It is the consequence of the lack of any legitimate political channel 
where opposing views and ideologies can be expressed. When conflicts no longer are 
accepted within the political, they will take other forms and shapes. The American 
hegemony has, through its excluding consensus, let go of the ability to respond to 
conflicts with other means than violence, since all kind of resistance is seen as total 
enmity. The solution is, I would argue, not universalism, but an acceptance of 
conflicts as a constituting nature for the political. Only then can the antagonism be 
transformed into agonism and conflicts dealt with politically. But this requires of 
broader definition of the political than what is offered by liberalism today. 
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7 Behnke - The Partisan model 
The danger of defining terrorism as a non-political concept per se, is elaborated 
further by Andreas Behnke.150 He starts his analysis with the question: how can we 
understand the event of September 11? He later widens this discussion to also involve 
the reactions to the terrorist attack and terrorism as a concept in general. According to 
Behnke, the main difference is between those who choose to describe it as a political 
act and those who think that it was not political. The aim of his discussion is to show 
the underlying reasoning behind and what the consequences are of either standpoint. 
For the purpose of this article, Al Qaeda represents international terrorism. 
7.1 Defining the political 
In contrast to Michael Ignatieff151 – but in line with Mouffe –, Behnke wishes to keep 
the scope of what is defined as political rather wide. He turns against what he calls 
Ignatieff’s formulation of “a typical Liberal position in which politics appears as the 
reasoned deliberation of rational actors about mutually acceptable strategies to attain 
collective goals”152, or “the juxtapositioning of politics and metaphysics as two 
irreconcilable domains”153. In Behnkes view, shared by Mouffe, the liberal consensus 
democracy’s understanding of politics necessarily excludes everything that is not 
rational. The liberals, thus, construct an artificial division between politics and what is 
defined as nihilism, since what is seen as the political only includes a mutual 
understanding about both the means and the goals. The only kinds of difference of 
opinions that are allowed in that sphere are minor variations of how these goals best 
can be achieved. 
Behnke, on the other hand, tries to show how this is not only a problematic 
ontological assumption, but, which is his main point, this narrow view of politics is a 
dangerous method to handle conflicts.154 Both arguments are important to consider 
since they both questions how terrorism, and especially states responses to it, affects 
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our basic understandings of what society should look like. 
7.2 A political decision 
As for the construction of the division, Behnke concludes that this decision in itself is 
what the liberals would describe as metaphysical. Constructing these boundaries is 
exactly what the liberals describes as non-political; namely what is right or wrong, 
good or evil and the idea that there is one single solution. Thus, the liberal idea of the 
political is based on what they argue to be metaphysical. The inside – the political – 
is, and will always be, understood in contrast to the outside, the excluded 
metaphysics.  
Behnke, however, regards this decision as political. Trying to establish artificial 
borders and hiding behind a strict terminology is a political attempt to de-legitimise 
other political opinions. Referring to Mouffe, Behnke considers this to be a sign of 
deeper conceptual problems within liberalism as such: “Focusing on the de-politicised 
basic entity of the Individual as a universal and general reference, it remains blind or 
even hostile to the argument that political processes, among them liberal democratic 
deliberations, can only take place within politically defined, historically situated 
communities”155. 
7.3 The problems of exclusion 
The idea of a universal political model in combination with the constitutive exclusion 
of everything that cannot be narrowed down to compromises, might, according to 
Behnke, lead to dangerous results. When de- legitimising acts and ideas as being non-
political, there can be no political solutions in sight and it leaves us with only two 
alternatives: right or wrong. Arguing that terrorism as such should not be excluded 
from the political sphere, Behnke then, too, turns to Carl Schmitt.156 
For Schmitt, politics was about handling the relation between friend and enemy. 
Behnke describes this as the art of enduring conflicts. Since conflicts are, and always 
will be, a fundamental part of society, Behnke and Mouffe, following Schmitt’s train 
of thought, claim that politics have to acknowledge conflicts rather than trying to 
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ignore them. To ensure that the political system is endurable, conflicts have to be 
endurable. Conflicts, therefore, must be channelled through political institutions. 
7.4 The partisan 
Violence from non-state actors constitutes a big risk of undermining the political 
structure. Not only does it often force its state counterpart to reply with even more 
violence, but it also challenges the state as an institution where conflicts are managed. 
Whereas violence between states can be characterised with the relation friend-enemy 
and is limited by the mutual understanding of state sovereignty, violence between a 
state and a non-state actor can be defined with the relation friend-foe. For this kind of 
conflict the only solution is total annihilation, no peace or settlement can ever be 
found. Terrorism is in this sense nothing new, and to understand the phenomenon, 
Behnke makes use of Schmitt’s discussion about the partisan. 157 
The partisan, in Schmitt’s view, stands for the contrast to the regular soldier. Violence 
from partisans, and being at war with them, should be understood as the opposite of 
the violence and war regulated by internationally accepted norms. 
According to Schmitt, four features characterise the partisan:158 
1. Irregularity. The partisan is not a part of any regular army and does usually 
not wear a uniform. It is also irregular regarding the use of methods, which is 
why the animosity increases into extreme hostility. The irregularity gives the 
partisan a number of advantages, such as being able to choose where and 
when the fighting occurs, and this leads to increased violence by the state. To 
be able to fight the partisan, the state responds with same methods and tactics, 
which then tend to increase the violence. 
2. Public/Political cause. The partisan is not just any criminal, but fights for 
what it considers to be a just cause. The motive is something bigger than a 
personal gain and is usually described in political terms. 
3. Increased mobility. This is a recognition of how the partisan adapts to new 
technology and its ability to be up to date. This statement is even more 
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important in the present high technological warfare. Trying to defeat the 
partisan purely by using more efficient weapons is deemed to fail. 
4. Tellurian nature. Traditionally, the partisan has been defending a particular 
territory. Most of its legitimacy has sprung from claims to a piece of land that 
has been occupied, so the partisan’s fight has been defined as defensive. Even 
if the goal for the partisan has been a total victory, i.e. no compromises could 
be accepted, this victory has been limited geographically. Thus, the partisan 
has not been characterised by having any claims of universality. This fourth 
criterion, however, is what makes the terrorist differ from Schmitt’s model of 
the partisan (which will be developed further below). 
7.5 The global partisan 
I want to emphasise that applying theses four criteria on the contemporary terrorist is 
not an attempt to once and for all define terrorism, but rather to make an effort to 
grasp how, and why, terrorism affects world politics, and how, and why, changes in 
world politics affects states’ responses to terrorism. As Behnke puts it: 
“understanding involves rendering the unfamiliar in the terms of the familiar”159. 
7.5.1 Irregularity 
As is rather obvious, most of Schmitt’s criteria match terrorist organisations such as 
Al Qaeda. It cannot be connected to any state in particular; it is rather a loosely 
connected network of people with the same objective. Their strategies and methods 
are undoubtedly irregular and there are especially two things that emphasise this: First 
of all, the non-existent distinction of military and civilian targets; all infidels are 
legitimate targets for an attack. Secondly, by using suicide bombers, they dismiss the 
traditional concern about casualties. Instead of fighting to stay alive, a suicide bomber 
uses his or her own death for a greater purpose.  
Both these methods are typical of Al Qaeda’s irregularity and have most definitely 
contributed to what the military responses have looked like. The high numbers of 
civilians killed and the military strategies used are but a few examples of how the 
American reaction more or less immediately mirrored the terrorist attacks. The 
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violence has clearly been radicalised and intens ified and the decision not to 
acknowledge the opponent as a legitimate party to the conflict is a good illustration 
how this can be described in terms of a partisan war.160 
7.5.2 Public/Political cause 
As for the public/political cause, Al Qaeda might not have one single goal with their 
struggle, but it is apparent that they do fight for something bigger than personal 
enrichment. Al Qaeda presents its own truth and universalism. Spreading Islam and 
eradicating Western influences from the Middle East stands in stark contrast to the 
Western led globalisation. As a result, the enemy turns to foe because of the two 
irreconcilable apprehensions of what the world should look like. For this reason, as I 
see it, there seems to be no time limit to this war. Whereas the partisan fought for 
freedom from its occupiers, Al Qaeda’s fight has no end. Since this also goes for its 
counterpart, the war takes indefinite proportions.161 
7.5.3 Increased mobility 
The increased mobility criterion, as well, is a distinct characteristic of Al Qaeda. Even 
if they do not have access to the same kind of high-end warfare technology as their 
opponents, Al Qaeda has been quick to adapt to technological innovations. They use 
computers, satellite phones and Internet to communicate. Furthermore, they are able 
to transfer huge amounts of money to finance their operations.162 Schmitt’s 
conclusion that a war against a partisan could never be won by using more powerful 
technology is probably one of the most important lessons to be learned in this ongoing 
war against terrorism. Other solutions than firepower will be needed if this war is ever 
to be ended.163 
7.5.4 Tellurian nature 
This fourth criterion is probably where Al Qaeda differs from Schmitt’s description of 
the partisan. Even though Al Qaeda refers to Americans on their holy land as being an 
                                                 
160 Behnke, 2004, pp. 302ff. 
161 Behnke, 2004, pp. 305ff. 
162 Behnke, 2004, pp. 307. 
163 Which, perhaps, might be happening now: “US commander in Afghanistan proposes revamped 
strategy”, The Guardian, August 31, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/31/afghanistan-
mcchrystal-strategy (visited 030909). 
  
62 
insult to the whole Muslim community, and especially the fact that American soldiers 
are positioned in Saudi-Arabia, this should rather be seen as an attempt to legitimate 
its struggle, than the true reason for it. Al Qaeda’s fight is not a defensive one. 
Additionally, the loose structure of the network and its many subdivisions located 
throughout the world is also a reason to why Al Qaeda does not fulfil the fourth 
criterion. However, Behnke argues that this should not be a reason to dismiss 
Schmitt’s model as such. Al Qaeda might not be exactly what Schmitt described as a 
partisan group, but this should not stop us from using Schmitt’s reasoning and 
conclusions. The consequences of waging a war against a global partisan might not be 
so different from one against the traditional one.164 
7.6 De-politicisation and de-humanisation 
This idea that the terrorist is a new version of the traditional partisan, steams from the 
development in world politics. A more globalised politics enhances globalisation of 
conflicts. But this relation is also converse: The less bound the partisan is to a specific 
territory and cause, the more its violence affects the state’s response into getting less 
political and more antagonistic.  
The consensus liberal universalism is what, according to Behnke, characterises the so-
called globalisation. What we see is the emergence of Western, and particularly 
American, values and understandings of politics, culture and economics. The changes 
in world politics, the Western dominance and hegemony, have brought with them a 
universalism and a de-legitimisation of opposing opinions. Consequently, what we 
see is a moralisation, i.e. a de-politicisation, of world politics. This is underscored by 
the reactions to September 11. Expressions like “defending humanity”, ”good and 
evil”, “right and wrong” etc, has been the most common reactions from American 
representatives, and which party of the conflict that belongs to humanity, good and 
right has not really been a question. 165 
In Behnke’s words, world politics has been both de-territorialised and de-
politicised.166 The result is a move towards a Pax Americana 167, where resistance is a 
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sign of enmity. Conflicts, in this context, do no longer take place between states and 
could never be settled peacefully. The antagonism increases and the enemy turns to 
foe; or in other words: 
By making humankind the definition of its political identity, or the Friend, the 
question of who the Enemy is takes on a particular significance. Traditional decisions 
about Friend and Enemy have taken place within the horizon of humanity. That is, 
humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction 
possible. Within the American imperial sovereignty, however, humanity becomes the 
positive pole in a universalist structure. And if the horizon is now also the positive 
part of the distinction, the Enemy can only be something that lies beyond that 
horizon, can only be something antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike – can 
only, in other words, be inhuman.168 
What, then, are the consequences of defining the enemy as inhuman?  
7.7 The partisan and the principle of non-refoulement 
By de-humanising the enemies, refusing them basic human rights is the logical next 
step. This is not only true for the ones caught in battle and denied the status of POW 
(as mentioned above), but for everyone associated with the foe. Thus, all alleged 
terrorists could easily be deprived of fundamental rights, such as non-refoulement, 
and this is why I find Behnke’s analysis of terrorism to be clarifying when discussing 
the use of methods that seem to violate human rights. This kind of argumentation also 
clears the way for making pure membership of an organisation illegal, without having 
to prove any particular illegal activities from the person concerned.169 
From this perspective, the use of diplomatic assurances is not the least problematic. 
The rights that are, or might be, violated as a consequence of using these methods are 
already taken from the alleged terrorists. I am, of course, aware that in reality it is not 
that simple. Even a person proven to be responsible for a severe terrorist act is not 
practically deprived of all his or her human rights. If this was to be true, diplomatic 
assurances would not be necessary at all, since the terrorist easily could be sent 
anywhere with no concern at all about his or her faith. States do still acknowledge that 
some fundamental rights should be respected, and if any derogation is considered it 
has to be motivated. What Behnke’s analysis offers is a description of a tendency in 
the world to justify grave human rights violations by labelling a person “terrorist”, 
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and the kind of politics that has caused this antagonism. He also explains how the 
GWoT is affecting how all alleged terrorists are treated; dealing with terrorism 
necessitates unconventional measures. 
8 Noll 
Schmitt’s definition of the partisan has also been used by Gregor Noll to understand 
the responses to contemporary terrorism.170 In Noll’s view, this could help us to 
understand how, and why, the GWoT might lead to permanent state of emergency. 
Noll’s theory is important because it describes the close interrelation between law and 
politics and tries to explain how changes in one sphere affect the other. For him, 
world politics should be seen as the context to where new ideas of the judicial have to 
be placed to be fully understood. At the same time, new comprehensions of 
international law could be the reason for transformations of world politics. 
8.1 Politicisation and mystification 
To understand the connection between changes in law and politics, Noll postulates 
two parallel processes that he claims are taking place today: (1) the re-politicisation of 
the law and (2) the re-mystification of politics.171 
- Noll’s starts out with what he calls the dissolvement of the dual ban of force in 
international law. Within a state, this means the prohibition for the state to use 
arbitrary force against an individual. According to Noll, the emergence of 
terrorism as a threat to state security has undermined this prohibition. The law 
is no longer applicable, since terrorism enables the use of exceptional 
measures. He sees Guantanamo, diplomatic assurances and the use of 
indefinite detention as three examples of how politics has enabled exception 
from the law. Some persons, i.e. alleged terrorists, are no longer protected by 
the same legal rights as others.172 
- The derogations from law take place in a context where the political has been 
                                                 
170 Noll Gregor, ”Rätt, myt och politik: folkrättens våldsförbud i undantagets gränsland”, in Amnéus, 
Diana and Gunner, Göran (eds.), 2003, Human Rights – from the frontiers of research, Uppsala: Iustus 
förlag. 
171 Noll, 2003, p. 188. 
172 Noll carries on analysing how this can be connected to the diluted prohibition on military force at 
the inter-state level. However interesting, this is outside the scope of this thesis. 
  
65 
re-mystified. This is how the securit isation process (which will be elaborated 
further below) works – the issue is no longer discussed in political terms, but 
rather in moral and military ditto. Phrases such as “war on terrorism”, “a 
crusade”, having to be “with us, or with the terrorists”, and rather talking 
about justice than law clearly shows how terrorism is associated with moral 
and military force and no longer with politics. Or what Behnke describes as 
being de-legitimised from the political and put into the sphere of metaphysics. 
As abovementioned, these two processes are connected. Discussions about the 
development, and perhaps amendments, of international law are situated in a context 
of right and wrong. Hence, there is not a rational, but a moral, debate about how 
terrorism should be dealt with.  
Noll asks himself why international law has not been able to oppose its relativisation 
and relates this to the nexus between norm and exception. According to Noll, in line 
with Schmitt and Agamben (see below), in extreme situations, the legal system can 
accept actions that would otherwise be deemed as illegal. But the exception could 
lead to either a new norm, or, as described by Agamben, a state of normlessness.173 
8.2 Relativisation of international law 
One possible answer, according to Noll, is that international law was not constructed 
to handle the kind of conflicts we see emerging today. The terrorists, such as Al 
Qaeda, do not fit in any definition of parties to a conflict, according to traditional 
international law (jus ad bellum or jus in bello). These kinds of conflicts can be 
described as asymmetrical, and since the conflicts are said to have a new character, 
many actors argue that so should also the rules regulating them (for instance Tony 
Blair174, Philip Bobbit175 and Ruth Wedgwood176). They claim that international law 
has not kept up with the changing patterns of international conflicts. 
On the other hand, international law has always been highly political. Parties to a 
conflict usually argue that this particular conflict has a “new quality” or is different 
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from the ones regulated by international law. According to Noll, these kinds of claims 
are rather the rule than the exception. 177 This is why it is so important to always ask 
oneself what the consequences are if derogations from the norms are accepted. 
8.3 Applying the partisan model 
To easier understand how this war on terrorism affects both international law and 
what methods that are accepted as legitimate to use to combat it, Noll, too, compares 
the terrorist – using Al Qaeda as the representative of contemporary international 
terrorism – to Carl Schmitt’s definition of the partisan and comes to the same 
conclusions as Behnke. Making use of Schmitt’s terminology, Noll defines the 
terrorist as a dislocated partisan. 178 
In a partisan war, peace is not an option – for neither part. The conflict is about right 
or wrong and therefore usually leads to more and more extreme violence. Both parts 
tend to legitimise their attacks outside their own territory as defence; not just 
defending its territory but especially its moral values and way of living. Furthermore, 
the war is thus usually described in mythological terms. 
Neither the partisan nor the terrorist is seen as a legitimate party to the conflict. In 
Noll’s view, the use of the phrase “GWoT” is very deceitful, but thus strategic. By 
applying the term “war” it is implied that military force is needed and that exceptions 
from normal regulations might be necessary. But by emphasising that the war is 
waged against terrorism, the opponent is de- legitimised as an equal party to the 
conflict. By disqualifying the enemy they are de-humanised and as a consequence 
they lose their human rights.179 
When international law is no longer respected, and exceptions are more common than 
applying the rules, the question is whether we have any system of norms at all? Or are 
we facing what Agamben has described as a permanent state of emergency?  
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9 Securitisation 
The starting-point for the theory of securitisation is to lay bare how, and why, a 
particular subject is articulated as a question of security. Securitisation is a discourse 
theory, focusing on how security as a concept is talked about and understood; the 
argument is that security is a speech act.180 The basic assumption is that there is no 
indispensable connection between what is articulated as a threat to security and an 
actual threat. According to this theory, the term security is referring only to itself. 
Something is considered to be a threat just because it is perceived that way. 181 The 
aim for the theory of securitisation is to describe this process: How is a subject 
securitised? By whom? And what are the consequences? 
An important reason why to use the securitisation theory to analyse how, and why, the 
principle of non-refoulement has become a problem for many states is that it resolves 
the problem of international law of treating states as “black boxes”. When states are 
discussed as subjects in international law, they are usually taken for granted, and seen 
as one singular subject contrasted to other such subjects. But in reality, the state is an 
arena in itself with many different, and most often conflicting, groups and interests. 
Just as Mouffe does, the securitisation theory questions this simplification and 
blindness to the importance of power relations in states, not only between them. 
9.1 The securitisation process 
According to the theory of securitisation,  security is what is publicly agreed to lie 
within that concept, and this has to be seen as an ongoing process. There is no definite 
definition of the expression, so what is considered to be a matter of security changes 
and is constantly under threat of being challenged by other views. This is a basic 
assumption for all social constructivist and discourse theories. 
The ability to define security is, thus, the starting-point for this theory and this is a 
question of power. Theoretically, anyone could be the securitising subject. But in 
practice, this process is mainly lead by the executive power within the state. However, 
this is usually done in conjunction with other powerful institutions in society, such as 
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the military, media, courts, researchers etc. Nevertheless, these groups are mainly 
focused on as being the audience that has to be convinced, rather than the subject. 
What happens once an issue has been securitised is that it is no longer discussed in 
political terms. It leaves the political sphere in favour of “high politics”. The 
securitised issue has to be dealt with in forms other than the traditional political and 
judicial. It, thus, legitimises the use of exceptional measures, or, in other words, “it 
requires emergency actions beyond the state’s standard procedures”182. These 
emergency actions are usually what under normal circumstances would be considered 
illegal or at least in some kind of grey area. Securitisation, therefore, describes a 
process, which results in a sort of state of emergency (which will be elaborated further 
below).  
Since the motive for the securitisation process is to legitimate emergency actions, i.e. 
the executive power’s right to make decisions without, or with less, interference from 
the legislative and judicial powers, this could be seen one explanation why it usually 
is the state that is the engine in this process. It is the state, and in particular the 
executive, that gains control and power to handle the issue once it has been 
securitised. 
But to successfully securitize an issue, it is not enough that the secur itising subject 
articulates the matter as being a threat to the security of the state.183 The relevant 
audience has to be convinced for this understanding to be mutually accepted. Who 
this is differs, but the more extreme measures the executive wants to have access to, 
the wider and more diverse this audience normally is. Other than the general public, 
the audience usually consists of institutions in society related to the particular matter. 
9.2 Making it work 
The securitisation theory uses a rather traditional realistic terminology for the analysis 
of the reference object and the threat. The reference object is usually the state, 
whereas the threat is anything that is described as an existential threat to the state: 
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“security is about survival”184. Nevertheless, the state as the reference object is 
problematised to some extent. What is interesting about the theory is the way it relates 
the reference object to the threat and the questioning of how this threat is created as a 
security threat. It is a deconstruction of the process, rather than the objects.  
The extraordinary measures have to be legitimised. This is an ongoing process, where 
different actors will try to articulate the threat in different ways. Hence, which 
discourse that will be dominating is primarily a question of power.185 But equally 
important, this articulation of a problem is not something stable or eternal and the 
securitising actor has to defend this definition of the threat continuously in all of those 
steps mentioned above. 
The securitisation theory mainly focuses on the process within a state, since this is 
usually the arena where the executive can exercise its power. But this process can just 
as well be applied to the international stage. The major difference is what audience 
that needs to be convinced. Whereas the audience within a state tends to be quite 
diverse, it is first and foremost other states tha t have to be convinced at the inter-state 
level. Nevertheless, other actors, such as international courts, IGOs, NGOs, media etc, 
could still play a most important part in promoting or rejecting the securitisation. 
9.3 Limitations  
The theory of securitisation does not set out to give an explanation why an issue is 
securitised. It tries to describe and analyse the process, but why the securitising 
subject in each and every case wants to securitize the issue is beyond the scope of the 
theory. Securitisation looks on this process from a discourse perspective, which is to 
say, it focuses on how the actor articulates the problem. As Ole Wæver puts it: 
”[S]ecurity thinking does not mean how actors think, which would be rather difficult 
to uncover – and not all that interesting. What is up for discussion here is how and 
what they think aloud”186. 
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9.4 Securitisation and the dissolvement of the political 
The process of securitisation could be seen as a model for understanding Mouffe and 
Behnke’s description of the liberal consensus democracy’s inability to handle 
conflicts and what Noll calls the re-mystification of the political. What all these 
theories have in common is the aim to explain how some actors can de-politicise a 
particular issue and why this is incredibly problematic. Whereas Mouffe, Behnke and 
Noll analyse the connection between law, politics and moral, the securitisation theory 
could be used as a tool to deconstruct this division between the political and the 
metaphysics.  
One important feature in securit isation is the spectrum the theory is based on: 
In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging 
from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is 
not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) 
through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, 
requiring government decision and resource allocation or, more rarely, 
some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning 
the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency 
measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure.187 
What Moffe and Behnke do is showing that in whatever way the issue is defined as 
outside the realm of politics, it always ends with an intensification of conflicts. 
Whereas securitisation describes the step when the issue is made “high politics”, 
Mouffe and Behnke demonstrate that the exact same effect emerges when the issue is 
deemed non-political. Furthermore, they emphasise that these divisions between the 
non-political and the political, and between a political issue and a securitised ditto, are 
in themselves political decisions. 
Another common denominator is the reference to discourse theory. They all focus on 
the question of power and show that what it all comes down to is the ability to define 
the political and its borders. In Mouffe and Behnke’s view, liberalism has tried to de-
legitimise conflicting opinions by articulating them as non-political. From their 
perspective, the problem is that the strive for consensus inevitably leads to an 
exclusion of conflicts within the political, which then tends to lead to an 
intensification of just those conflicts. To avoid the process of securitisation and the 
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de-legitimisation of conflicts, the borders of the political should not be too strict.  
Important to bear in mind when discussing the philosophical reasoning behind these 
theories is that securitisation should be seen as a post-structural realism. As such, it 
first and foremost accepts some entities in society as given. This does not mean that 
they are essentially objective, but that they exists as social and historical facts. Just as 
Mouffe bases her theory of agonism on conflicts between collectives as social facts, 
so does the theory of securitisation. It is thereafter the social constructivist analysis of 
how security is created as a speech act takes place. Thus, securitisation is a social 
constructivist theory, but not what is commonly described as post-structuralist; it does 
not aim to deconstruct everything. 188 
9.5 Critique against the theory of securitisation189 
An analytically focused critique against the theory is that while securitisation aims at 
deconstructing security threats, the definition of security is taken for granted. By 
arguing that security is always about surviving and countering existential threats, the 
theory accepts the traditional realistic notion of security, and has, consequently, a 
rather limited de-constructivistic pursuit. There is somewhat of a gap between arguing 
that it is the actors that make up security by a speech act, but not taking into 
consideration how they perceive what security is.190 This singular definition of 
security does not manage to make enough allowance for the empirical context. The 
meaning of security has to, as is the securitisation process, be more flexible and allow 
for contextual variations.191 
Moreover, securitisation has, to some extent, become a buzzword. It is rather easy to 
dismiss the executive’s attempt to handle an issue, by arguing that it has become 
securitised. However, these claims are not always proven to be true in terms of 
empirical facts. For example, Christina Boswell has criticised the statement that 
migration in Europe has been securitised for being a simplification of the matter. 
According to Boswell, what the theory of securitisation lacks, is a credible description 
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of the nexus between the levels of discourse and practice. Migration might very well 
have been securitised at the discourse level, but whether this has spread to the 
organisational level where the policies are implemented is not yet investigated 
enough. Boswell means that the scheme of securitisation is an adequate description of 
the power politics of the discourse level, but does not manage to explain how the 
organisational level is constructed and is functioning. The strive for power and control 
is, in contrast to the pursuit of the executive, not the most distinguishable feature 
when policies are implemented. At the administrative level there are many other, 
often contradictory, interests that thwart the move to a single outcome. Thus, the 
proponents of the securitisation theory have failed both to analytically describe this 
connection between policy and its implementation, and to empirically show what 
practical consequences securitisation at the discourse level has had.192 
This kind of critique has also emerged from advocates of the theory of embedded 
liberalism. They argue that thanks to the major influence of liberal values in all levels 
of the state, the executive’s power is restricted in a number of ways. Firstly, through 
the constitution, providing all citizens certain rights. Secondly, the division of power 
ensures that other institutions, such as courts, will slow down and affect a sudden 
change of political mindsets. Thirdly, the obligations towards other states emanating 
from regional and international treaties curtail the executive’s line of options. 
Whether this struggle should be explained in terms of embedded liberalism or as a 
discursive practice where all actors are trying to win the privilege of interpretation 
could be a matter of extensive debate. However, as I will show below, the theory of 
embedded liberalism does not provide a sufficient explanation, since there are a 
growing number of cases where the courts have accepted the executive’s perspective. 
Thus, constitutional rights and division of power does not offer enough protection. 
Moreover, the problems with insufficient protection from constitutions and 
international HRL are discussed in the first section of this paper. 
Finally, one could also criticise the theory of securitisation for being too focused on 
the political speech act. The reasons for the speech act, the conditions or causes that 
influence the securitisation process, are not deemed irrelevant, but much less 
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analysed. It seems like too little importance is attributed to what causes the process to 
begin with and as with all discourse theories, it might become too relativistic. On the 
other hand, as Barry Buzan argues: “States, like people, can be paranoid (constructing 
threats where none exist) or complacent (ignoring actual threats). But since it is the 
success (or not) of the securitization that determines whether action is taken, that side 
of threat analysis deserves scrutiny just as close as that given to the materia l side”193. 
9.6 Securitisation and terrorism 
Many states have seen terrorism as a subject needed to be securitised. It has been 
done so by being articulated as an existential threat to the state. Because of this, the 
state has been given the right to use a lot of means that it usually does not. It is mainly 
the state itself that has acted in this securitisation process, but is has had a lot of help 
by many other actors in society. Especially media has played a major part in 
articulating terrorism as an existential threat. 
What is meant by the term terrorism, however, is worth a thesis in its own right. Since 
there is no clear and mutually accepted definition of it – neither by states, nor by 
scholars – terrorism as a concept fits perfectly as a threat to be securitised. The vaguer 
the threat is, the wider are the margins of appreciations for the ones who are 
interpreting it. Because of this, states have been able to use the terrorist threat to 
legitimise numerous of actions that otherwise would have been hard to win 
acceptance for. Today, almost any group or organisation with a slightly radical 
agenda opposing the state, could be described in terms of terrorism. Hence, terrorism 
has become a powerful discursive tool for states, used to combat opposing non-state 
agents.194 
9.6.1 The connection between the national and the international 
How the threat is defined and used in the securitisation process illustrates the 
connection between securitisation at the international level and at the national. This 
could be seen as a two way process where both levels affect each other. For instance, 
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many states have referred to resolutions from the Security Council while arguing that 
exceptional measures are not only needed, but required to fulfil their international 
obligations.195 On the other hand, states striving for international responses to be put 
in action to prevent terrorism usually refer to their national security. Thus, to 
understand how terrorism has been securitised, one has to include both national and 
international politics in the analysis. 
9.6.2 The reference object 
What is being threatened is not always clear, though. The state usually relies on secret 
evidence, so what the public is being told is that the state officials have to be trusted. 
But since most terrorism today is associated with Islamic fundamentalism and 
because well-known representatives, such as Bin Laden, have promoted the killing of 
any infidel, it has been rather easy for states to equate the threat against the state to a 
threat against its citizens. Thus, the idea that terrorism is a threat to the citizens of 
most Western states is rather accepted today. 
9.6.3 The relevant audience 
For the executive power to properly securitize terrorism, it’s not enough to convince 
the military, media and the public opinion. Since the executive’s options of how to 
handle terrorism is restricted by many legal and political restrains, it also has to 
convince the legislative and judicial powers that terrorism is of such an existential 
threat that those restrains have to be loosened. 
9.6.4 Other states as audience 
When it comes to international law, changing the norms is quite a complex process. 
Changing customary law usually takes long time, and it is seldom easy to affect the 
law with a new convention since most of the times there are not only just one treaty 
regulating the issue at stake. Regarding terrorism there are some specific conventions 
regulating that, but since the restrains to state action often is found in the vast amount 
of human rights treaties, most executives (at least the ones considering themselves 
bound by these treaties) find amending all of them to be a much too slow process. 
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Nevertheless, many changes have taken place since a big number of states do 
acknowledge that terrorism is a threat to their security. What they have not been able 
to agree upon is how big this threat actually is, meaning what kind of actions it 
legitimises. There is still no consensus about what kind of derogations and limitations 
from HRL that are necessary. So, even if terrorism could be considered to have been 
securitised at an inter-state level, there are still controversies regarding what 
extraordinary measures the executive might use. 
9.6.5 Convincing the courts 
Like I mentioned above, convincing the lawmaking power is not enough. The judicial 
power also has to be convinced that the terrorism threat demands extraordinary 
measures. Both because the judicial power sometimes have the ability to stop or slow 
down legal changes and since it usually has the power to make the executive refrain 
from derogating from the norms it is bound by. This process, too, has been very 
complex. A look at case law tells us that the judicial power has at once been willing 
and reluctant to accept the executive’s description of terrorism as being an existential 
threat to the state. That this process is all about the executive trying to persuade the 
courts was evident in the aforementioned case of Youssef v. Home Office196. 
The aforementioned case law from ECtHR and SIAC and the decisions by CAT and 
HRC show that there is not one single answer to how the courts and committees have 
reacted to the executives’ attempts to securitize terrorism. But one plausible 
conclusion is that while they usually have agreed that terrorism constitutes a great 
threat to state security, and states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, most 
courts have not been willing to accept all extraordinary measures the executives have 
been proposing. In general, the case law shows that the courts have been rather 
critical to the  executives’ attempts to justify derogations from their human rights 
responsibilities by referring to the threat from terrorism. 
9.6.6 The Suresh case 
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases where courts have accepted that HRL can 
be derogated from in the name of state security. As mentioned above, the ECtHR has 
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not excluded the use of diplomatic assurances per se as incompatible with the 
Convention. Another illustrating example is the Suresh case in Canada.197 Michel 
Coutu and Marie-Hélène Giroux’s analysis of the case clearly shows how courts too 
are affected by political and moral changes in a society. 198 In comparison to earlier 
case law, Suresh sets a new precedent. Whereas the principle of non-refoulment 
earlier had hindered extraditions that would be in conflict with the Canadian 
constitution, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Suresh was based on the idea that 
terrorism, as a threat to security must be balanced against the rights for the individual. 
Coutu and Giroux explain this change as a shift in the underlying reasoning by the 
court. They claim that the judgement is a result of a formalistic, rather than a value-
based jurisprudence, which rely on the legal system and regulations as such, instead 
of the moral values and principles behind it. From having been a “guardian of the 
Canadian constitution”, the Supreme Court amends its task to interpret and judge on 
the formal norms it has been given. According to Coutu and Giroux, “the Tribunal has 
put aside discourse ethics […] to the benefit of formal legality – which is nothing 
else, in the circumstances, than judicial deference towards governmental and 
administrative decisionism”199.  
Thus, the Suresh case is important not only from a legal perspective, but perhaps even 
more so as an example of how courts are affected by changes in the political climate. 
The securitisation of terrorism is probably a major cause to the transformation of the 
underlying ethics and the reasoning behind the judgement. This paragraph, in 
particular, shows how the court has accepted the executive’s description of the issue: 
They [the terrorist attacks of 9/11] are a reminder of that in matters of 
national security, cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to 
underline the need for the judicial arm of the government to respect 
the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether 
support for terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat 
to national security.200 
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9.7 The struggle of the definition 
This clearly shows how the securitisation process works. Since it is a matter of 
discourse, there is no final answer to how the terrorism threat will be articulated. 
There are many powers in society countervailing the attempts to establish one 
hegemonic view on a subject. One discourse is always questioned by another and in 
the end a question of power. Therefore, the theory of securitisation does not only 
show the dangers of securitising a subject and moving it away from the fields of 
politics; it also explains how the opposite could happen, how a subject can be de-
securitised and once again be considered to be a matter of politics. In that way, 
securitisation is highly political and emancipating. This, too, is what Mouffe and 
Behnke argue: a widening of the political to avoid antagonism. As mentioned before, 
to avoid getting stuck in the sphere of metaphysics where there can be no peaceful 
settlements, conflicts – and thus terrorism – need to be addressed politically. 
10 The state of emergency 
10.1 Schmitt and the theory of securitisation 
Since many of the theories I am using are based on Carl Schmitt’s definition of the 
political, turning to Schmitt could also give the theory of securitisation a deeper 
understanding. In Rita Taureck’s analysis of the securitisation theory, she argues that 
Schmitt in many ways has affected the theory. Referring to Williams 201, Taureck sees 
a connection between the existential threat that the securitising actor points out and 
Schmitt’s understanding of the political: “[J]ust as the nature of ‘the political’ is 
determined by the division between friend and enemy, the nature of ‘security’ is 
determined by the division between normal democratic rule and extraordinary politics 
beyond rules and regulations”202. It is the existential threat, the enemy of the state, 
which justifies this exception. 
Another similarity is Schmitt’s division between friend and enemy and the 
securitisation theory’s description of how a “we” and “they” is created. The 
securitising actor identifies itself with the reference object, the state, but distinguishes 
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itself from the threat. Taureck gives two reasons why this division is necessary: 
“[F]irst because security is always relational in the sense that one actor’s 
insecurity/security hinges on another actor’s insecurity/security – the classic security 
dilemma; and, second, it makes little sense to speak of one actor’s security (the ‘self’) 
without recognizing the source of the threat (the ‘other’), as in the absence of ‘the 
other’ there is no need for security”203. This also connects the theory to Mouffe’s 
description of how different collectives are driven further away from each other 
because of the excluding practice of the consensus. 
However, Taureck recognises one important distinction between Schmitt and the 
securitisation theory. For Schmitt, the executive’s choice to take on exceptional 
measures was all about its own decision whether to do that or not. It lies within the 
realms of the executive’s power to take that decision. Securitisation, on the other 
hand, describes a much more complex process where the executive is but one actor 
trying to influence this process. 
Lastly, there is also a normative difference. Whereas the securitisation process has 
been critically analysed, Schmitt considered this to be something politically 
necessary. Since Schmitt meant that the political precedes the law, and the political is 
based on the conflict between friend and enemy, it is the obligation of the executive to 
derogate from the law if this conflict becomes too intense. According to Schmitt, it is 
the decision, rather than a rational discussion, that defines the executive, and the most 
important decision is the one about the state of emergency. The executive’s right to 
declare a state of emergency is what legitimises its power. However, this state of 
emergency does not mean a dissolvement of the law for the executive’s own sake, but 
should be used as a tool to once again create order. The law prerequisites order, not 
the other way around, and this is why law can never precede the political.  
But this can only be true as long as the state of emergency is temporal. Securitisation 
as such is not necessarily a problem. Some issues might be of such a big threat that 
they do legitimate emergency actions that otherwise would be illegal. However, 
which Noll points out, the state of emergency has to be limited both in time and 
space. What we see today is the extension of the state of emergency from being a 
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necessary tool to prevent a specific threat from destabilising the society, to becoming 
a permanent part that society. Thus, securitisation and the exclusion of conflicts from 
the political might result in a permanent state of emergency. 204 This is why Schmitt’s 
theory about the executive’s right to declare a state of emergency no longer properly 
describes contemporary world politics. 
10.2 Agamben 
This is also what Agamben argues. In contrast to Schmitt, Agamben looks on the state 
of emergency with suspicion. He takes on where Schmitt ended: at the attempt of 
trying to include the state of emergency within the realms of the law. 205 The state of 
emergency, in Agamben's terms, is not an abolishment of the law; the law is still in 
place, but without significance.206 Thus, there is no need for a formal derogation or 
limitation of the rights provided by human rights treaties. By the de-humanisation of 
some people, or the creation of the homo sacer, the outcast, they are excluded from 
society and thereby the realms of law. 207 The law is in force, but has abandoned the 
ones with no rights. 
According to Agamben, and Schmitt, the state of emergency is no anomaly to the 
democratic society, but rather its precondition. For Schmitt, this is what constitutes 
sovereignty. Agamben, however, does not view the state of emergency as a theoretical 
necessity, but as a historical fact. The development of democracy and the politics 
within democratic states, shows, according to Agamben, that the state of emergency is 
no longer a state of exception, but has become the norm.208 The exclusion from, and 
the undermining of, the principle of non-refoulement, is but one of many examples of 
human rights that formally persist, but without much significance to the ones in most 
need of its protection. 
11 Discussion and conclusions 
As shown in section one, from a legalistic perspective, diplomatic assurances might 
be very problematic, but perhaps possible to justify. Whereas the individual’s legal 
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rights can be codified in a lot of documents, the realisation of these rights will always 
take place in a specific context. In this context there will necessarily be other interests 
to consider. Whether to provide a particular right or not in a specific situation requires 
a balance of those different interests. This has particularly been emphasised by 
governments, trying to unleash themselves from human rights restrictions such as 
non-refoulement, when countering terrorism. The necessity to assess each and every 
case individually and to always consider all relevant information has been 
acknowledged by all the courts and committees that I have looked into. For this 
reason, the use of diplomatic assurances has not been ruled out as incompatible with 
the principle of non-refoulement. On the other hand, no international court or 
committee has yet accepted an assurance as sufficient protection. Consequently, the 
diplomatic assurances that have been used this far has not been in accordance with 
international law. 
Furthermore, as shown in the last part of the first section, a systematic use of 
diplomatic assurances might defy the purpose of the conventions wherein non-
refoulement is expressed. Even though this claim has not yet been considered by the 
courts, I consider this to be the main argument why diplomatic assurances should be 
deemed unlawful. This is also the answer to the first question I asked myself in the 
beginning of this paper: the legal implications of the use of diplomatic assurances are, 
on an individual level, many, but could possibly be overcome; however, from a 
structural perspective, diplomatic assurances could probably be regarded as 
undermining the principle of non-refoulement, and therefore considered unlawful. 
The problem with this legalistic view is that the legal system of norms is seen as a 
closed system, referring only back to itself. For this reason, a discussion about the 
principle of non-refoulement and whether the use of diplomatic assurances are 
violating it cannot go beyond the perspective “right or wrong”. This is the reason why 
I, in the second section, contextualised the problem politically and theoretically. The 
politics behind the GWoT is a necessary background for understanding why 
diplomatic assurances have to be analysed as being a part of a wider anti terrorism 
policy, risking to undermine the human rights it is said to protect.  
The purpose of the second section was to both give a background to why governments 
resort to methods that seem judicially problematic, and to discuss what wider political 
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consequences the use of diplomatic assurances might have. If this discussion is 
analysed from a social constructivist perspective, where the legal system is seen as a 
reflection of, and always in relation to, political and moral values in a society, one can 
easily see the limits of the legalistic view. The principle of non-refoulement and its 
importance is not worth much in a world where some people are deprived of all their 
rights. When the security perspective has become the hegemonic power and all 
opponents are de- legitimised and de-humanised, their legal rights lose substance. 
Diplomatic assurances could, from a legalistic perspective, be seen as an attempt to 
mediate between conflicting interests. But put in a wider context, with the help from 
Mouffe, Benhnke, Noll and the securitisation theory, these methods should rather be 
seen as symbols of, and the result of, political changes. The decision to exclude 
everyone that questions the consensus hegemony as non-political, and the 
securitisation of terrorism, has led to increased antagonism and a widening of the gap 
between different parts of the world. In this narrow discourse, principles such as non-
refoulement are nothing but empty words. 
Coutu and Giroux’s analysis of the Suresh case – which they describe as a shift of 
reasoning in the balance between liberty and security – and SIAC’s judgements in 
UK, demonstrates that a division of power clearly is not enough to safeguard 
principles such as non-refoulement when politics in a society are changing. An 
independent judicial power might, and has proven to do so, slow down and perhaps 
influence these political and moral changes. But in a longer perspective, which is also 
confirmed by the theories I have based this paper on, what is needed is a political 
understanding of the problems and another political alternative to the excluding 
consensus democracy. However independent on a formal level, the judicial power too 
is affected by processes such as securitisation and the mystification of the political. 
This is especially important when this security perspective shapes the laws that the 
courts are to interpret and judge from. Once again referring to Coutu and Giroux’s 
Canadian example, they state that “the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act remains, in 
nature, an emergency legislation. The perennial dilemma of ‘liberty vs. security’ is, so 
to speak, in it ab initio”209. The whole legal system is thus affected by the emergency 
measures the state considers to be necessary. 
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If diplomatic assurances, and, particularly MOUs, are used systematically, they risk 
becoming its own structure and model for deportation: a parallel system. Thus, the 
absolute ban on torture and the prohibition to return a person to a country where he or 
she might face torture are undermined by this parallel system. The absolute rights are 
reserved for people not considered to be terrorists; the citizens have rights, the aliens 
are de-humanised. They are the partisans, with which the state is fighting a never-
ending war. This is my answer to my question what the consequences might be if the 
use of diplomatic assurances is systemised. Diplomatic assurances are a part of the 
construction of this parallel system and the undermining of the principle of non-
refoulement. The method is at the same time legitimised by the processes described 
by Mouffe, Behnke and Noll, while also a catalyst increasing these processes. By 
undermining non-refoulement, and accepting different standards for different people, 
the democratic system as such is undermined. Therefore, which has been argued 
many a times before, there is a risk that the GWoT destroys just what it is said to 
protect. Diplomatic assurances should therefore be understood as a part of this war, 
and its usage could not be reduced to a discussion about legal foreseeability or 
whether an assurance reduces the risk of torture in a particular case. The structural 
effects of it, and the reasoning behind it, are political, and, consequently, so must the 
analysis be. 
SIAC in UK seems to be the best example of how the executive power has been able 
to convince the court that “the rules of the game have changed”. In all cases referred 
to above, they have fully accepted the executive's perspective, arguing that the MOUs 
offer sufficient protection. This does, indeed, seem to imply that terrorism has been 
securitised. However, other courts and committees have been reluctant to accept this 
reasoning, stating that the principle of non-refoulement is absolute and that only if the 
assurances reduce the risk of torture enough, can they be regarded as sufficient 
protection. This could be described as a struggle of how to define terrorism and the 
impacts of it. Until now, the courts have been powerful enough to affect the discourse, 
claiming that human rights should prevail. Nevertheless, as the case of Agiza and the 
Swedish government’s rejection to admit any responsibility illustrates, the states are 
not very willing to listen to the courts. Since terrorism has been securitised, the 
executive considers itself to have the moral, political and judicial responsibilities to 
deal with it. 
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Finally, the construction of a parallel system could also be analysed by Agamben’s 
theory of the state of emergency. For Schmitt, the state of emergency was a temporal 
suspension of the law, so that the executive would have to ability to restore the order. 
This ability to declare the state of emergency is what constitutes the executive’s 
power and legitimacy. But for Agamben this can only be true if this state actually is 
temporal. The exception cannot legitimize the norm, when the exception becomes the 
norm. What we see emerging today is that the state of emergency loses its temporal 
feature and becomes permanent. The parallel system of diplomatic assurances 
becomes the norm, which undermines the previous norm. This is why diplomatic 
assurances cannot solely be discussed in terms of legality, but has to be analysed in 
their political context. The securitisation of terrorism risks becoming permanent, and 
therefore, the exceptions from normal legal standards this legitimises, may create a 
permanent state of emergency. Or, as described by Buzan: 
It thus becomes clear that terrorism poses a double threat to liberal democratic 
societies: open direct assaults of the type that have become all too familiar, and 
insidious erosion as a consequence of the countermeasures taken. It is easy to see 
how this dilemma drives some towards seeking a solution in total victory that will 
eliminate both the terrorists and the contradiction. But if it is impossible to eliminate 
terrorists, as is probably the case, then this drive risks the kind of permanent 
mobilization that inevitably corrodes liberal practices and values (emphasis 
added).210  
When the political opponent has turned into an antagonistic, de-humanised enemy, 
based on the indefinite GWoT, diplomatic assurances are not used to ensure 
protection, but to disguise the weakening of human rights and democratic principles. 
One again, quoting Noll: 
It is frequently argued that terrorism will prevail as soon as human rights are 
compromised in the struggle against it. The ambiguity of such statements should give 
us pause; apart from its common sense, it can also be understood as an imperative to 
protect the concept of human rights from being tainted by the violence unleashed in 
the ‘war on terror’. With regard to diplomatic assurances, the same ambiguity is at 
work. Rather than assuring the captive of protection against harm, it may be that 
human rights as such are merely assuring themselves. Thereby, the rendering 
community may feel that the conception of human rights remains unharmed by the 
struggle that unfolds itself during the rendition process.211 
An enduring answer to how the problems of the undermining of non-refoulement can 
be solved, is therefore more of a political than legal nature. This is also the answer to 
my final object with this paper: a discussion about de lege ferenda. What is needed is 
                                                 
210 Buzan, 2006, p. 1117. 
211 Noll, 2006, section VI. 
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not a legal change, but a different perspective on terrorism. The political sphere has to 
be widened and political opponents acknowledged rather than de-legitimised. A de-
mystification of politics, a de-securitisation of terrorism and a re-humanisation of 
alleged terrorists are a few first steps required if democracy and the Rechtsstaat are to 
be restored. 
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Acronyms and abbreviations 
CAT  Committee against Torture 
CSS  Critical Security Studies 
CoE  Council of Europe 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court for Human Rights 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
EU  European Union 
GWoT  Global War on Terror 
HRC  Human Rights Committee 
HRL  Human Rights Law 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IGO  Inter-governmental Organisation 
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation 
POW  Prisoner of War 
SIAC  Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
UN  United Nations 
UN GA United Nations General Assembly 
UN SC United Nations Security Council 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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